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Race and the Decision To Detain a
Suspect
Sheri Lynn Johnsont
Thirty years ago police stopped Malcolm X because he was a black
man in a white neighborhood.' A revolution in civil rights later, police
still view race as an important factor in the decision to detain a suspect.
The facts behind the recent Supreme Court case of Kolender v. Lawson= 2
are instructive: During a two-year period, Edward Lawson, a law-abiding
black citizen with a penchant for strolling through white neighborhoods,
was detained or arrested fifteen times under a California statute requiring
"suspicious" persons to identify themselves to a policeman's satisfaction.
Even more disturbing than this persistent discrimination is the limited and
ambivalent response it has evoked from the courts. The judicial reaction to
other disquieting indicia of suspicion, such as youth, a "hippie" appear-
ance, or presence in a "crime-prone" neighborhood, has been similarly
disorganized.
The Supreme Court has developed a two-tier standard for measuring
the legality of a detention: The prosecution must establish "probable
cause" to justify a full custodial arrest and it must show "reasonable sus-
picion" to justify an investigatory stop and frisk.' Both concepts focus on
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1. M. LITTLE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 145-46 (1964):
Our only close brush with the law came once when we were making our getaway, three of us
in the front seat of the car, and the back seat loaded with stuff. Suddenly we saw a police car
round the corner, coming toward us, and it went on past us. They were just cruising. But then
in the rear-view mirror, we saw them make a U-turn, and we knew they were going to flash
us to stop. They had spotted us, in passing, as Negroes, and they knew that Negroes had no
business in the area at that hour.
2. 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983) (voiding statute for vagueness).
3. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 25-27 (1968).
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the aggregate information available to the police and stress the uniqueness
of each constellation of facts. This focus has allowed the Court and com-
mentators to neglect the question of whether some facts are impermissible
constituents of that constellation.
Without systematic guidance concerning which facts may help to justify
police interference with individual freedom, some lower courts give great
deference to police testimony on criminal profiles and crime-prone neigh-
borhoods, while others refuse to give any weight to these factors. It is
therefore not enough to know that race alone will never establish probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion; we must also ask whether or when
race may be used to tip the scales from not-quite-probable cause to proba-
ble cause.
This Article addresses the permissible components of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion. Part I shows how both probabilistic and consti-
tutional considerations limit the factors that police may consider in decid-
ing to detain suspects. Part II then examines the varied uses of race as an
element in the determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Part III criticizes these uses, questioning both whether race is relevant
and whether the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause in any
case forbids its use. Finally, Part IV sketches possible applications of this
method to other disputed indicia of criminal conduct.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE
OF RACE IN DETENTION DECISIONS
The Fourth Amendment provides that a valid arrest warrant may issue
only upon an oath or affidavit setting forth facts that establish probable
cause.4 Because a lesser standard for warrantless arrests would have cre-
ated a disincentive for procuring a warrant and would have provided a
means of circumventing the Fourth Amendment, courts have readily in-
ferred a probable cause requirement for warrantless arrests as well.5 De-
spite the courts' insistence on adherence to a probable cause standard, the
concept itself remains sketchy. Probable cause is more than good faith
suspicion; it requires a reasonable basis for belief in guilt.' It "exists
where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. Because the Fourth Amendment's protections are "implicit in 'the
concept of ordered liberty,'" the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fourth
Amendment applicable to the states. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
5. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
6. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925).
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offense has been or is being committed."'7 Because the totality of these
facts and circumstances is central, "seldom does a decision in one case
handily dispose of the next."'
In Terry v. Ohio,9 the Supreme Court upheld a temporary investigative
seizure and patdown-a "stop and frisk"-based upon less than probable
cause.10 This less intrusive stop requires "reasonable suspicion," "articul-
able reasons," or "founded suspicion."'" Reasonable suspicion is present
when an officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
.. . 2 Predictably, this concept also remains elusive. Because reasona-
ble suspicion, like probable cause, focuses on the totality of the circum-
stances, "clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that
arise" is impossible."
Probable cause is more demanding than reasonable suspicion in two
respects. The former reaches only completed or ongoing crimes, while the
latter encompasses imminent criminal activity. Probable cause also de-
mands greater confidence in the interpretation of the facts observed. For
the purposes of this Article, however, these differences are irrelevant. Both
standards require an estimation of the likelihood of an individual's wrong-
doing and both justify action by state or federal law enforcement agents.
These shared characteristics determine coextensive constraints-both
probabilistic and constitutional-on the facts that may be relied upon to
justify a suspect's detention.
A. Probabilistic Constraints
The Supreme Court has repeatedly commanded a unique calculation of
the degree of suspicion generated by each particular fact pattern. Neither
the courts nor legal scholars have sufficiently stressed the necessary first
step of such a calculation: separating facts that contribute to the likelihood
of criminal activity from those that do not.
7. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. at 162).
8. Hinton v. United States, 424 F.2d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("elements of a finding of proba-
ble cause are as varied as encounters between citizens and police"); see United States v. Davis, 458
F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Viewed singly these factors [about defendant's behavior] may not be
dispositive, yet when viewed in unison the puzzle may fit.").
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. Id. at 26-27 (interests implicated in police intrusions short of decision to arrest do not require
finding probable cause). If a suspect consents to being questioned, no seizure is involved and no
justification is required. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 n.* (1980).
11. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (discussing meaning of "articulable
reasons" and "founded suspicion"); N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1981) (requiring
"reasonable suspicion" for stop and frisk).
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
13. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
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1. The Concepts of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion
"In dealing with probable cause, .. .as the very name implies, we
deal with probabilities."14 Similarly, the concept of reasonable suspicion
"does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities."15 Mistakes
are therefore possible, but they "must be those of reasonable men, acting
on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability."" Thus, each
fact contributing to probable cause must increase the probability that a
crime has been, is being, or will be committed; it must be more often
present when a particular crime (or type of crime) is being committed
than when it is not. Because probable cause contemplates the totality of
circumstances, a relevant fact is one that adds to the likelihood of criminal
activity, given the other facts also observed. On the one hand, a bulge at
the waistband may be significantly related to the carrying of contraband,
but if it is observed in conjunction with other signs of obesity, it has no
probative value. On the other hand, although riding a bicycle probably is
not statistically related to the commission of any crime, riding one late at
night in a warehouse district may correlate highly with participation in a
burglary. Essentially, a reasonable police officer ignores those facts that,
controlling for other observed facts, do not increase the likelihood of crimi-
nal activity.
Of course, focusing on probability does not require multiple regression
analysis or other sophisticated statistical techniques. The Supreme Court
has from the outset stated that the calculations involved "are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. '1 7 The Court has
recently used similar language to explain that the probabilities relevant to
reasonable suspicion are "commonsense" and must be applied "not in
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement."1 8 Although the aim in selecting facts to
justify probable cause or reasonable suspicion must be objective prediction,
practicality tempers the precision of the prediction required.
14. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
15. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
16. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 175.
18. The Supreme Court has recently extended this commonsense standard to determinations
which used to be somewhat more formalistic. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418; see also
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2228-32 (1983) (rejecting "rigid. . .two-pronged test" for deter-
mining reliability of informants' tips established by Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969),
and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)).
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2. Applications of the Concepts
In most street detentions, a police officer's own observations or the ob-
servations of other officers prompt his action. 9 The variety of "suspi-
cious" facts or circumstances police may witness is nearly infinite, but
most fall into one of four general categories. The simplest factor is con-
duct resembling a crime or necessary preparation for that crime. A more
subtle factor that attracts police attention is conduct that appears to reflect
consciousness of guilt. In addition, characteristics of the actor may either
legitimate observed conduct or render it more suspect. Finally, the envi-
ronment in which the actor is observed may aid in the interpretation of his
conduct. The Supreme Court has never addressed the question of which of
these categories of observations-or which subsets from each cate-
gory-may properly contribute to probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Nevertheless, the Court's pronouncements on the nature of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion, and the sporadic attempts by lower courts to
exclude some observations as irrelevant, suggest a few general constraints.
Courts occasionally demand proof of a correlation between an allegedly
suspicious fact and criminal activity,2" but most often they assume its rele-
vance without discussion. No opinion of which I am aware explains when
and why a demonstration of predictive power is necessary, but reference to
the "commonsense" limit on the concept of probability suggests a distinc-
tion: When a fact is intuitively related to the commission of crime, defen-
dants do not challenge its use and courts do not require extrinsic proof of
correlation. For example, an officer might testify that he observed the de-
fendant forcing open a door. Although dispute over the weight properly
accorded to this fact is possible, dispute over its relevance is extremely
unlikely. "Everyone knows" that this action increases the probability that
a crime is in progress, and a police officer is entitled to rely upon collec-
tive knowledge of this kind. The conclusion that forcing a door is proba-
tive of criminal activity is derived from two empirical assumptions: (i)
forcing a door frequently occurs as part of a burglary; and (ii) forcing a
door rarely occurs in law-abiding behavior. Because neither of these as-
sumptions really is debatable, courts can comfortably accept the resulting
predictor without statistical proof.
Conduct Resembling a Crime.-Courts seldom demand proof that con-
duct resembling a crime or part of a criminal escapade is probative of
criminal activity. When they do, it is often because knowledge of how the
19. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 16-17 (1967).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(rejecting use of drug courier profile where no evidence was offered in support of its accuracy); United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (rejecting ethnic element of hijacker pro-
file "for which there is no experimental basis").
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criminal act is executed is not widespread. Some courts, for example, once
required expert testimony that glassine envelopes were used to transport
heroin before they would admit as evidence observations of a glassine en-
velope exchange." Extrinsic proof of criminal patterns is necessary when
the first empirical assumption underlying a conclusion of relevance does
not rely on common sense.22
Conduct that Appears to Reflect Consciousness of Guilt.-Conduct
thought to reflect consciousness of guilt is more often challenged. In this
kind of inquiry, the first empirical assumption relies on common sense: A
criminal's awareness of his wrongdoing will prompt him to engage in sec-
ondary conduct designed to avoid detection or apprehension. The difficulty
concerns the second assumption: Is the allegedly evasive conduct also so
common among the innocent that it does not predict criminality?
Some indicators of evasion are clear. It is unlikely that an innocent per-
son will flee a uniformed officer after a request to stop.2 3 When an officer
insufficiently identifies his office or mission, however, courts may ascribe
a citizen's "flight" to fear, distaste, or disinterest.24
Law enforcement agents cite an amazing variety of behavior as indicat-
ing consciousness of guilt. Police have inferred an attempt to conceal both
from a traffic violator's reach toward the dashboard or floor of a car, and
from his alighting from his car and walking toward the police.25 Drug
Enforcement Agency officers have inferred a desire to avoid detection both
from a traveler's being the last passenger to get off a plane26 and from his
being the first.2 7 Immigration and Naturalization Service agents have ar-
21. See People v. Corrado, 22 N.Y.2d 308, 313, 239 N.E.2d 526, 529, 292 N.Y.S.2d 648, 651-52
(1968) (glassine envelopes "have come to be accepted as the telltale sign of heroin").
22. See People v. Alexander, 37 N.Y.2d 202, 203, 333 N.E.2d 157, 157, 371 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877
(1975) (empirical assumption supported by extrinsic evidence that more than half of officer's narcotics
arrests involved glassine envelopes).
23. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968) (approving search of defendant because
his "deliberately furtive actions and flight at sight of law officer were proper factors" in decision to
arrest).
24. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1963) (when plainclothes officer "af-
firmatively misrepresented" himself, defendant's flight offered "no . . . inference of guilty
knowledge"); People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 589-90, 408 N.E.2d 908, 912-13, 430 N.Y.S.2d
578, 583 (defendant followed by unmarked police car driven by plainclothes officers might "have
acted evasively out of fear for his own safety"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
25. See People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 826-28, 478 P.2d 449, 462-63, 91 Cal. Rptr.
729, 742-43 (1970) (noting and rejecting claim of probable cause based on both "furtive gestures" and
defendant's alighting from car).
26. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980) (leaving plane last an element
in drug courier profile).
27. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOP-
MENTS, 1979-1980, at 137-39 (1981). In discussing Mendenhall, Kamisar contrasts the DEA's reli-
ance on Mendenhall's being the last person to exit from the plane with another prosecutor's reliance
on a defendant's having been the first passenger off, and remarks that "[alt this point, it would not
surprise me if one of these days the government argues that a certain defendant met the profile be-
cause when the passengers deplaned he was exactly in the middle of the line-to avoid attracting
attention, of course." Id. at 138.
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gued both that it was suspicious that the occupants of a vehicle reacted
nervously when a patrol car passed, and that it was suspicious that the
occupants failed to look at the patrol car.2 ' Finally, the government has
argued in a customs case that "excessive" calmness is suspicious. 29
Although police experience may fill in gaps in common knowledge con-
cerning how frequently the observed conduct is part of a criminal activity,
it cannot contradict a commonsense perception that the conduct is usually
part of an innocent pattern."0 This may be because police are experts only
on the antisocial, not the normal; perhaps if expert evidence of "normal"
conduct were proffered, it would also be acceptable.
Characteristics of the Actor.-Police presumptions of criminal activity
that are based on status or personal appearance operate in much the same
way as do presumptions based on conduct resembling a crime. If a person
is removing a tire from a car, knowledge that he is not the owner in-
creases the probability that he is stealing the tire. If the driver of a car
appears to be about twelve years old, his appearance predicts that he is
driving without a license. These factors require no demonstration of rele-
vance because "everyone knows" they supply or correlate strongly with an
element of the offense in question: A person who commits larceny takes
property he does not own, and a person who appears to be twelve is un-
likely to be sixteen and therefore old enough to obtain a valid license.
The use of personal characteristics to infer propensity to commit a
crime is more problematic. Police have on occasion asserted that youth,3 ' a
"hippie" appearance,3 2 ethnicity,33 or race34 contribute to probable cause
28. See United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting claim of rea-
sonable suspicion based on defendants' not looking at marked patrol car because INS had previously
claimed that repeated glances at patrol car were grounds for suspicion).
29. See Unitcd States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992-93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
902 (1977).
Judges may doubt that these cited behaviors are unusual among those with clear consciences. When
they are skeptical, however, they do not ask for either clinical or statistical evidence of frequency
among the general population-they simply reject the factor as non-probative. See United States v.
Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566 & n.4 (6th Cir.) (according no weight to alleged nervousness and noting
contradictory government arguments in prior cases), cert. denied sub. norn. Brooks v. United States,
444 U.S. 878 (1979); supra note 25.
30. See People v. Corrado, 22 N.Y.2d 308, 313 & n.3, 239 N.E.2d 526, 529 & n.3, 292 N.Y.S.2d
648, 651-52 & n.3 (1968) (manila envelopes rejected as a telltale sign of drug traffic because com-
monly used for other purposes); People v. Brunson, 65 A.D.2d 684, 685, 409 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734
(1978) (brown paper bag rejected as hallmark of drug trade because of myriad non-criminal uses).
31. See Commonwealth v. Bacon, 411 N.E.2d 772, 775 (Mass. 1980) (rejecting claim that car
occupants' youthfulness was probative); State v. Ruud, 90 N.M. 647, 648-49, 567 P.2d 496, 498 (Ct.
App. 1977) (rejecting officer's "hunch" that "driver [who] just looked young to me" should be
stopped).
32. See United States v. Sherman, 430 F.2d 1402, 1404, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1970) ("hippie-type"
appearance permissible element of probable cause calculus), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
33. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975) (claiming correlation between
apparent Mexican ancestry and illegal alien status); infra pp. 230-33, 239 (discussing illegal alien
cases).
34. See United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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or reasonable suspicion. Although these assertions are nonintuitive, courts
usually accept them without requiring proof of statistical correlation.
Some of the confusion surrounding the use of personal characteristics as
indices of criminality may stem from sub silentio judicial notice of well-
known criminological data. There are numerous studies showing statisti-
cally significant correlations between youth and crime, particularly street
crime.3 5 These findings are both uncontradicted and well publicized. For-
mal introduction of these studies into evidence may be more "technical"
than the concept of probable cause requires. Similarly, propensity argu-
ments from the actor's status as an ex-convict may be so well supported by
recidivism research that documentation is pointless.36 When, however,
such data are not available, basing probable cause upon an actor's per-
sonal characteristics violates the probability constraint.
The Environment of the Actor.-Early Supreme Court decisions recog-
nized that the environment in which certain conduct occurs can contribute
to its suspiciousness.3 7 The first such decision approved consideration of
the coincidence of a suspect's itinerary with the travel pattern of a smug-
gler;38 recent decisions approve consideration of a suspect's departure from
a major narcotics "source city" and his arrival in a major narcotics distri-
bution center. 39 This use of geography is conceptually sound if the itiner-
ary is both common among criminals and relatively uncommon among
innocent persons. If law enforcement agents cite too many (or too many
commonplace) origin/destination patterns as congruent with criminal traf-
fic, courts may-and should-reject their testimony. .
Building on the precedent surrounding travel patterns, police and pros-
ecutors began to use congruence with local crime patterns in a second,
more ambitious way. A police officer will testify that he observed the de-
35. In 1981, approximately 67% of the persons arrested and charged with the serious crimes
included in the FBI's Crime Index were younger than 25 and one third were younger than 18. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 177 (1982) (Table
34).
36. For example, 80% of the adults in the FBI's Criminal History file who were arrested for
robbery between 1970 and 1974 were repeat offenders, averaging five prior arrests each. C. SILBER-
MAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 49, 51 (1978).
37. In re the Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 374 (1824) (that vessel was seized in remote area
known to be haven for smugglers is relevant to, but not dispositive of, question of probable cause);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-60 (1925) (relevant to probable cause determination that
defendants were driving in area known to be "one of the worst active centers for [bootlegging]");
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1949) (same). Either direct proof or judicial notice
of environmental factors is sufficient. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 168.
38. In re the Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 374 (1824).
39. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980).
40. See United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566-67 (6th Cir.) (rejecting such testimony
because "our experience with DEA agent testimony in other cases makes us wonder whether there
exists any city in the country which a DEA agent will not characterize as either a major narcotics
distribution center or a city through which drug couriers pass on their way to a major narcotics
distribution center"), cert. denied sub nor. Brooks v. United States, 444 U.S. 878 (1979).
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fendant at the corner of Sixth Street and Eighth Avenue and that the
junction of those two streets is located in a high crime area; the prosecutor
will argue that the location itself increased the suspiciousness of the defen-
dant's action. Although courts consistently deem crime rates relevant,41
commentators have expressed concern over the adverse effect on honest
citizens living in high crime areas.42
41. See, e.g., United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
878 (1977); United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. Rios, 51 Cal. App.
3d 1008, 1010, 124 Cal. Rptr. 737, 737-38 (1975); People v. Oden, 36 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 329 N.E.2d
188, 191, 368 N.Y.S.2d 508, 512 (1975); State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 295, 414 N.E.2d
1044, 1047 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
42. See J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 218 (2d ed. 1975):
If an honest citizen resides in a neighborhood heavily populated by criminals, just as the
chances are high that he might be one, so too are the chances high that he might be mistaken
for one. The probabilities, from the point of view of the individual, are always the
same-either he is or is not culpable. Thus, behavior which seems "reasonable" to the police
because of the character of the neighborhood is seen by the honest citizen in it as irresponsible
and unreasonable. About him, more errors will necessarily be made under a "reasonableness"
standard.
Judicial caution has been limited to expression of concern that police attribute too much weight to a
high crime neighborhood setting, sometimes detaining a suspect for mere residence in a ghetto. See
United States v. Thomas, 551 F.2d 347, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976); People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 645,
156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 860, 597 P.2d 115, 119 (1979); People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594, 606-07, 416
N.E.2d 1015, 1021-22, 435 N.Y.S.2d 679, 685-86 (1980) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
The courts should be more cautious. The basis for declaring an area crime-prone may be flimsy.
Some police officers describe all areas as "crime-prone." See Racine v. State, 51 Ala. App. 484, 488,
286 So. 2d 890, 894 (Crim. App. 1973) (approving characterization of "upper class" neighborhood as
burglary-prone). Even when an officer describes an area as crime-prone and relates the number of
arrests he has made in it, courts should require evidence that such a number is unusually high.
In addition, unless there is some identity between the prevalent crime and the crime suspected, a
"crime-prone" neighborhood does not increase the probability that a particular crime is being commit-
ted. See People v. Lathan, 38 Cal. App. 3d 911, 915, 113 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974) (noting that
officer's testimony about crime in area never revealed kind of criminal activity to which he was refer-
ring). In a state where consensual sodomy is illegal, for example, a gay community may be demon-
strably "crime-prone," but this is irrelevant if the crime suspected is a drug deal. Conversely, in a
community that has a low overall crime rate but a disproportionate number of rapes, police may
consider that pattern when investigating possible rape. See State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169, 181, 214
N.W.2d 595, 603 (1974).
Finally, even the information that a neighborhood has many drug transactions does not insure that
a street exchange occurring in that neighborhood is more likely to be a drug deal than is an exchange
in an ordinary neighborhood. In order to increase the probability of a particular exchange's being
drug-related, a higher proportion of street transactions in the drug-prone area (not merely a higher
number) must involve controlled substances. An equation between number and proportion requires
the additional empirical assumption that the drug-prone neighborhood has the same number of street
exchanges as does the control neighborhood. Since most poor neighborhoods have substantially more
street activity than do suburban neighborhoods-both innocent and culpable-this assumption is im-
probable. A weaker assumption is possible: The high drug traffic area has proportionately less addi-
tional street activity than additional drug sales. This assumption, if correct, would also give the factor
of neighborhood predictive power, but the lesser weight should be acknowledged. The leap from
higher numbers to higher proportion is only troublesome in possessory crimes; it is quite likely that
the legal transport of valuable objects at night is as unusual in a burglary-prone area as in a peaceful
one. See Commonwealth v. Holloway, 229 Pa. Super. 128, 130-31, 323 A.2d 216, 217 (1974); State
v. Sinclair, 11 Wash. App. 523, 523 P.2d 1209 (1974).
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B. Other Constitutional Constraints
Despite the lack of clear and consistent standards, courts attempt to
apply Fourth Amendment requirements to all detention decisions. In con-
trast, they rarely consider the application of other constitutional con-
straints. Perhaps this is because a focus on Fourth Amendment constraints
can increase the accuracy of detention decisions, while consideraton of
nonprobabilistic constitutional constraints can only decrease accuracy.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment is not a constitution unto itself. Law
enforcement cannot be exempted from compliance with other constitu-
tional provisions. The values behind those other provisions must trump
efficient police work. Some of these constitutional provisions, like probable
cause, circumscribe the facts that may properly be considered in a decision
to detain.
1. Historical Fair Trial Considerations
That facts would be inadmissible as evidence at trial no longer pre-
cludes their use in establishing probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Although early Supreme Court dicta stated that "[a] search warrant may
issue only upon evidence which would be competent in the trial of the
offense before a jury,"'43 the Court later rejected this position in Brinegar
v. United States:
44
[The emphasis on the criterion of admissibility into evidence at trial]
goes much too far in confusing and disregarding the difference be-
tween what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is
required to show probable cause for arrest or search. . . . There is a
large difference between the two things to be proved, as well as be-
tween the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like dif-
ference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish
them.45
The information at issue in Brinegar-the defendants' pending indictment
on a similar charge-was inadmissible at trial not for its lack of probative
value, but for its potentially prejudicial effect upon the jury. Because the
issue of probable cause is tried by a judge, the Court deemed concern over
prejudice at a suppression hearing unnecessary. 46 Thus, the rule that ra-
43. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932); see Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d
557, 564-65 (6th Cir. 1948) (applying Grau to search warrants).
44. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
45. Id. at 172-73.
46. Id. at 173. Prior arrests and convictions, although not admissible at trial to prove guilt, are
considered on the issue of probable cause for the same reasons. See, e.g., United States v. McNally,
473 F.2d 934, 940 (3d Cir. 1973) (prior convictions and arrests relevant to determination of suspi-
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cial propensity arguments are not permitted at trial does not in itself pre-
clude such arguments at suppression hearings.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Constraints
Although fair trial evidentiary safeguards do not now limit the facts to
be considered in a decision to detain, some other constitutional protections
clearly do.47 The Fourteenth Amendment has thus far been largely unex-
plored in this context, yet it has the potential to restrict significantly the
probative information police may use to justify detentions. In its command
that no state "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws,"48 the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' 49 Thus, an official's deci-
sion to detain a suspect violates the Constitution if it "make[s] unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances." 0
In assessing an equal protection claim, a court "must first determine
what burden of justification the classification created thereby must meet
by looking to the nature of the classification and the individual interests
dousness); United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 999-1000 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (prior conviction
properly considered), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Commonwealth v. Gullett, 459 Pa. 431,
437-38, 441, 329 A.2d 513, 516, 518 (1974) (prior arrests properly considered).
47. The Fourth Amendment requires that when illegally acquired evidence is exploited to obtain
other evidence, the derivative evidence is inadmissible as "fruit of a poisonous tree." Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). Thus, if a search which violates the defendant's legiti-
mate expectations of privacy uncovers real evidence, that evidence may not be used to establish proba-
ble cause of his arrest. But see Commonwealth v. Weiss, 348 N.E.2d 787, 790 (Mass. 1976) (where
information independent of illegal search provides sufficient factual basis for probable cause, illegal
search will not taint arrest or require suppression of its fruits). The seizure clause mandates a similar
exclusion of some relevant facts: If an illegal stop and frisk prompts incriminating statements from the
defendant, those statements cannot be used to justify his subsequent arrest. Violations of statutory
wiretapping restrictions are similarly subject to the poisonous fruits doctrine. See Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 339-41 (1939).
Because the poisonous fruits doctrine has also been applied to unconstitutionally conducted lineups,
see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-42 (1967), and illegally obtained confessions, see Harri-
son v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222-26 (1968), the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination further circumscribe the
facts that the prosecution may use to establish probable cause. Theoretically, facts justifying detention
decisions are thereby limited. The rules of standing, however, make it difficult for a defendant to
challenge detention decision criteria. While a statement from a third party or a lineup involving a co-
defendant may help establish the predicate for the defendant's arrest, the defendant does not have
standing to challenge the legality of those events. Lineups or statements violating the defendant's own
Fifth Amendment rights usually do not form the basis of his detention, but follow from it. Thus, the
Fourth Amendment itself provides the only frequently observed nonprobabilistic constraint on deten-
tion decisions.
48. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (striking down state tax law
favoring local corporations). The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal pro-
tection component similarly constraining the United States. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954) (striking down school segregation in District of Columbia). Together, they subject to judicial
scrutiny all governmental actions that classify individuals for different benefits or burdens.
50. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating facially neutral laundry ordi-
nance enforced discriminatorily against Chinese).
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affected." 51 Because the individual interest affected by decisions to de-
tain-freedom from police interference-has never been deemed a "funda-
mental interest" for purposes of equal protection analysis, most criteria
for detention need only "bear[ ] some fair relationship to a legitimate pub-
lic purpose." 52 This minimal scrutiny dovetails with the definitional re-
quirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion since it allows con-
sideration of any statistically relevant information.
Classifications that disadvantage a suspect class, such as a racial minor-
ity, must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est." 53 When these classifications are used to determine whom the police
may detain, this greater burden of justification should be placed on the
government. Nevertheless, courts reviewing detention decisions eschew the
heightened scrutiny analysis accorded these classifications in other con-
texts.54 I turn now to detention decisions relying upon the most notorious
of these classifications: race.
II. PRESENT USES OF RACE IN DETENTION DECISIONS
Police sometimes assert that a suspect's race contributed to their deci-
sion to detain him. Although no case condones race as the sole basis for an
investigative stop,55 courts often allow it to tip the scales of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion. Most approving opinions address neither the
probabilistic nor the constitutional obstacles discussed in Part I.
A. Identification of a Particular Offender
Law enforcement officers routinely use race as a detention factor when
a victim or witness has described the perpetrator of a particular crime;
such descriptions almost always include the perpetrator's race. Courts re-
ject objections that race should be ignored in this situation. 5 As one opin-
51. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974) (invalidating residency re-
quirement for provision of free non-emergency medical care to indigents); see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (striking down Wisconsin statute requiring residents to prove payment of child
support before remarriage).
52. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (describing standard to be used in reviewing most
forms of state action).
53. Id. at 217. In addition, forms of classification such as gender-based distinctions which, while
not suspect, "give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties," id., must "serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing level of scrutiny for gender-based distinctions).
54. The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications in other areas of crimi-
nal procedure. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1880) (invalidating state statute
restricting jury service to white males); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (upholding prosecu-
tion of judge who excluded blacks from grand juries).
55. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975) (ethnicity alone cannot
supply reasonable suspicion).
56. See United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836 (1976);
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ion explains, race per se does not form the basis for a stop, but "is simply
a characteristic which may properly be used as one element of identifica-
tion."5 7 No disparate treatment is involved: "If, in this case, the race of
those both described and apprehended were caucasian or oriental, rather
than black-and all other circumstances were identical-there is no doubt
but that the same result would follow."58
Occasionally, however, the coincidence of the suspect's and the perpe-
trator's race seems to be the only factor supporting the detention. In
United States v. Collins," for example, the Eighth Circuit upheld the stop
of a black man alone in a white Cadillac based on the information that a
bank several miles away had been robbed by three black men in a brown
Cadillac.60 The majority explained simply that "the color of a person's
skin. . . is an identifying factor which. . . assists the police in narrow-
ing the scope of their identification procedure." 1 In dissent, Judge Heany
argued that a racial description can never create suspicion of a particular
person, but can only eliminate from suspicion all persons of another
race."' Although Heany's position is unique, some courts have refused to
give much weight to congruence between the perpetrator's and the sus-
pect's race,63 and others have deemed congruence sufficient only when few
persons of the perpetrator's race are present in the area."
B. Incongruity
Police manuals often instruct officers to become familiar with their beat
and question persons who do not "belong." 5 Participant-observation
Franklin v. State, 374 So. 2d 1151, 1153-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1113
(Fla. 1980); Patterson v. State, 270 Ind. 469, 473, 386 N.E.2d 936, 939 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
935 (1980); State v. Buie, 297 N.C. 159, 162, 254 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971
(1980).
57. Franklin v. State, 374 So. 2d at 1154.
58. Id.
59. 532 F.2d 79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836 (1976).
60. Id. at 81, 83; see also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 4, 223 A.2d 873, 875
(1966) (report of black burglar with mustache in brown coat justifies stop of black without mustache
but in need of shave in light colored coat).
61. 532 F.2d at 82.
62. Id. at 85-86 (Heany, J., dissenting).
63. See Commonwealth v. Sams, 465 Pa. 323, 326-28, 350 A.2d 788, 789-90 (1976) (stopping
black youths in area where violent black gang fight occurred insufficiently founded on racial coinci-
dence); Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 341-42, 263 A.2d 342, 344 (1970) (probable cause
not established when only reasons for stopping defendant were his race and proximity to scene of
crime).
64. See Smith v. Swenson, 328 F. Supp. 747, 752 (W.D. Mo. 1971); People v. Grice, 87 Ill. App.
3d 718, 723, 410 N.E.2d 209, 214-15 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1003 (1981); State v. Anderson,
204 Neb. 186, 188, 193, 281 N.W.2d 743, 745, 747 (1979); see also infra pp. 229-30, 243, 246-49
(discussing use of racial incongruity in detention decisions).
65. See J. KLarER & J. KANovrm, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw FOR POLcE § 2.6 (3d ed. 1977)
(citing several police manuals' instructions concerning "suspicious persons"); L. TIFFANY, D. MCIN-
TYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 19, at 38-39 (same).
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studies report that this practice is an important part of police patrol be-
havior.6 8 When the incongruity prompting police action is the suspect's
race, the few courts that have considered the issue are divided in their
responses.
In Arizona, for example, it is now well settled that racial incongruity
may contribute to suspicion. In State v. Ruiz,17 police officers walking on
their beat observed the defendant, a Hispanic, enter a liquor store. The
officers explained "that it was very unusual to see a person of either
'white' or Mexican descent in this particular area, and that it had been
their experience in the past that the few 'whites' or Mexicans who were
in the area were there for the purpose of purchasing narcotics." 8 The
court held that this information alone gave rise to reasonable suspicion. 9
In State v. Dean,70 the Supreme Court of Arizona approved Ruiz. Po-
lice officers observed Mr. Dean sitting in a dented car parked in front of a
small apartment complex. He appeared to be nervous and the arresting
officer testified, "you know, when we first observed him we could tell that
something wasn't correct. He just didn't look, I mean-he was a Mexican
male in a predominantly white neighborhood of-oh, middle to upper-
middle class people . . . .71 The court found that these facts established
reasonable suspicion, then addressed Dean's objection to reliance on his
ethnicity:
The transcript indicates that Dean's ethnic background was only one
of several factors which caused the officers to believe that further
investigation was necessary. That a person is observed in a neighbor-
hood not frequented by persons of his ethnic background is quite
Often a basis for an officer's initial suspicion. To attempt by judicial
fiat to say he may not do this ignores the practical aspects of good
law enforcement. While detention and investigation based on ethnic
background alone would be arbitrary and capricious and therefore
impermissible, the fact that a person is obviously out of place in a
particular neighborhood is one of several factors that may be consid-
ered by an officer and the court in determining whether an investiga-
tion and detention is reasonable and therefore lawful. 2
Arizona courts are extreme in requiring very little besides racial incon-
gruity to justify a Terry stop. Several courts have implied that unexpected
66. For classic studies in this area, see W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUS-
PECT INTO CuSTObY (1965); L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 19, at
18-43.
67. 19 Ariz. App. 84, 504 P.2d 1307 (1973).
68. Id. at 84, 504 P.2d at 1307.
69. Id. at 86, 504 P.2d at 1309.
70. 112 Ariz. 437, 543 P.2d 425 (1975).
71. Id. at 439, 543 P.2d at 427.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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racial presence may contribute to reasonable suspicion, but hold that it is
far from sufficient. In United States v. Richard,"' for example, the Third
Circuit noted that "the presence of two black males cruising in a car in a
predominantly white neighborhood is, by itself, insufficient cause for a be-
lief that those persons have participated in a recent crime in the neighbor-
hood."'74 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bodden1 5 the Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court reversed a trial judge's finding that the defendant's race and
rate of movement alone constituted reasonable suspicion.7
California has decided the matter differently. In People v. Bower7 the
arresting officer testified that his decision to arrest the appellant, a white
male, was based upon the appellant's presence at night in a black area
"where the officer had never observed a white person 'on foot in the hours
of darkness . . . for innocent purpose."' 7  The court rejected an inference
of suspicion on both Fourth Amendment and state constitutional grounds:
Initially, the fact that appellant was a white man could raise no rea-
sonable suspicion of crime. A person's racial status is not an "un-
usual" circumstance and the presence of an individual of one race in
an area inhabited primarily by members of another race is not a
sufficient basis to suggest that crime is afoot. Freedom to travel and
associate are fundamental rights in this state, and the suggestion that
their exercise can contribute to a lawful seizure of one's person
under these circumstances is both illogical and intolerable."
The state's contention that the officer's experience with white outsiders
was "specialized knowledge" entitled to judicial deference did not impress
the majority. The court recalled earlier decisions noting that the use of
data about the alleged crime rate of an area is easily subject to abuse, then
analogized that "it should be obvious that one officer's perception of the
criminal tendencies of a racial group is far more so.'80
The strangest race-as-incongruous-and-therefore-suspicious case is
United States v. Magda.81 According to the district court, the arresting
73. 535 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1976).
74. Id. at 248 (emphasis added) (but also holding that incongruity may properly be a factor).
75. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 560, 417 N.E.2d 468 (1981).
76. Id. at 560-61, 417 N.E.2d at 468-69; see also People v. Estrialgo, 37 Misc. 2d 264, 265, 276,
284, 233 N.Y.S.2d 558, 561, 571, 579 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (Puerto Rican youngsters' carrying expensive
luggage in white neighborhood of Brooklyn Heights does not establish probable cause), rev'd on other
grounds, 19 A.D.2d 509, 245 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 783, 189 N.E.2d 384, 250
N.Y.S.2d 293 (1964).
77. 24 Cal. 3d 638, 597 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979).
78. Id. at 644, 597 P.2d at 119, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
79. Id. at 644-45, 597 P.2d at 119, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
80. Id. at 646-47, 597 P.2d at 120, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (emphasis in original). Justice Clark in
dissent condemned the majority's disregard of the officer's expertise as a "cruel hoax" that would
sentence the neighborhood's law-abiding residents to "further inhumanity." Id. at 650, 597 P.2d at
123, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 864 (Clark, J., dissenting).
81. 409 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976).
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officer's sole justification for stopping the white defendant was the officer's
observation of an exchange between the defendant and a young black man
in a "narcotics-prone" area. The officer did not describe the exchange as
furtive; neither participant fled; and after the exchange the defendant
turned toward the officer and walked past him. The court suppressed the
evidence, noting that
There [was] nothing in the record to show that it is more likely than
not that narcotics dealing can be reasonably expected to generate this
kind of encounter between a young white and a young black person
than between two men of the same race, between two women, or
between any two human beings of any different ethnic origin or
class.82
The Second Circuit reversed.83 Citing the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's admonition that "the circumstances before [the officer] are not to be
dissected and viewed singly; rather they must be considered as a whole,"84
the appeals court held that the officer's conduct was reasonable given the
combination of circumstances present.85 Despite this stress on considering
all the facts, the opinion nowhere mentioned that the exchange was an
interracial one, but relied vaguely on the officer's "expertise." Judge Mot-
ley's dissent attacked the characterization of the area as crime-prone, re-
vealed the sharply limited nature of the officer's expertise, and pointed out
the ordinary and innocuous nature of the exchange and parting,8" but she
too ignored the interracial aspect focused on by the lower court.
In another racial incongruity case of the speak-no-evil genre, People v.
Tinsley,"' a New York appeals court affirmed a conviction without stating
the facts in the case, citing only the officer's "street-wise" observations
and expertise. 88 The dissent, however, protested that the defendant's ac-
tions were totally innocuous and that "the ethnic identity of these three
boys is what really caused alarm because of the area in which they were
walking."8 The New York Court of Appeals summarily reversed, stating
only that it relied upon the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division."
82. 409 F. Supp. at 740.
83. 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 758 (quoting United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
85. 547 F.2d. at 758-59.
86. Id. at 761-65 (Motley, J., dissenting).
87. 48 A.D.2d 779, 369 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1975), rev'd sub nora. People v. T., 39 N.Y.2d 1028, 355
N.E.2d 302, 387 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1976).
88. Id. at 779, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 143. The defendant and several other youths had been strolling
up a street, briefly looking into store windows and entering several stores, before they walked into a
residential area. Id. at 780, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44 (Stevens, P.J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 781, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
90. People v. T., 39 N.Y.2d 1028, 1029, 355 N.E.2d 302, 302, 387 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (1976).
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Finally, the Supreme Court's decision last Term in Kolender v. Law-
son,91 which invalidated a California statute requiring suspicious citi-
zens to identify themselves to police, never mentioned that the respondent,
who had been arrested fifteen times, was a black male who wore his hair
in dreadlocks, and had been arrested while walking in white
neighborhoods.
C. Illegal Aliens
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employs race as an
element in establishing probable cause in searches for illegal aliens. Some-
times, the INS uses race simply as an identifying factor.92 In the vast
majority of litigated cases, however, the INS has no description of a par-
ticular alien, yet claims that the defendant's Hispanic or Asian appear-
ance contributed to the decision to detain him.1
3
The Supreme Court has twice approved the use of race as a legitimate
factor in INS detention decisions. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,"
the Court considered whether roving border patrols could detain persons
absent reasonable suspicion. A substantial portion of the defendant's brief
was devoted to arguing that the stops at issue were based upon race and
that, regardless of their legitimacy under the Fourth Amendment, they
violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause.95 The argument relied upon traditional equal protection
cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,"6 Korematsu v. United States,'9 and
Loving v. Virginia." The United States first claimed that the stops were
based upon more than race,9' and then argued that consideration of racial
appearance was permissible:
91. 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).
92. See United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F.2d 834, 836-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (agent justified in ques-
tioning person of Hispanic appearance outside house suspected of harboring illegal aliens); United
States v. Chaidez-Castro, 430 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1970) (police may use racial appearance in
combination with other factors in deciding to search truck for illegal aliens).
93. See Cheung Tin Wong v. United States, 468 F.2d 1123, 1127-28 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (INS
investigator acted on reasonable suspicion in detaining person of Asian appearance given surrounding
circumstances); Hon Keung Kung v. District Director, INS, 356 F. Supp. 571, 575 (E.D. Mo. 1973)
(race relevant factor in deciding to question person of Oriental appearance in room indicated by an
informant).
94. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
95. Brief for Respondent at 46-55, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
96. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (municipality may not arbitrarily and unjustly discriminate on basis of
race in administration of municipal ordinance).
97. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding constitutional executive order excluding persons of Japanese
descent from West Coast military area during war emergency).
98. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional state statute intended to prevent marriages be-
tween persons solely on basis of racial classifications).
99. Reply Brief for the United States at 2-3, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975).
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The officers' actions were not invidiously discriminatory. It is be-
cause racial or ethnic characteristics are in most circumstances irrele-
vant that discrimination on the basis of such characteristics is forbid-
den. . . . Since the class of violators is composed of persons who are
likely to appear to be of Mexican descent, it is not impermissible for
law enforcement officers to take that fact into account in determining
which persons should be asked about their citizenship. The situation
here is analogous to that in which law enforcement officers are given
descriptions of robbery suspects that include the suspects' race.
Surely it would not be impermissible for the officers to limit their
investigation to persons who fit the descriptions. Similarly, "common
sense [dictates] that. race may be a relevant factor in some circum-
stances in determining whether to question a person about his immi-
gration status."100
The Court's opinion sidestepped these equal protection arguments, hold-
ing that roving border patrols could not detain persons absent reasonable
suspicion,10 1 and that even in border areas, apparent Mexican descent
alone did not supply that suspicion. 12 Then, in careful and clipped dicta,
the Court approved a more restrained use of race: "The likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor .... ""
The Court again confronted the use of race by the INS in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte.10 The majority approved both routine stops at a per-
manent checkpoint located away from the border and selective referrals
for further questioning not supported by reasonable suspicion. The major-
ity perceived "no constitutional violation" even if referrals for secondary
interrogation were based largely upon apparent Mexican ancestry; the
opinion rationalized unequal treatment by citing the minimal nature of
the intrusion involved and the need for broad discretion.10 5 Despite the
defendant's invocation of the equal protection clause, 10 6 the Court again
declined to employ it. In a footnote, the Court cited statistics showing that
twenty percent of the vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area
contained illegal aliens as proof that the existing reliance on race "clearly
is relevant to the law enforcement need to be served. 107 The majority
expressed a single tentative caveat: "[D]ifferent considerations" would ap-
100. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
101. 422 U.S. at 884.
102. Id. at 885-86.
103. Id. at 886-87.
104. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
105. Id. at 563-64.
106. Respondent's Brief at 43, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
107. 428 U.S. at 564 n.17.
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ply if agents near the Canadian border relied upon Mexican ancestry to
decide when to conduct secondary inspections.10 8
Justice Brennan, joined in dissent by Justice Marshall, objected both to
the abandonment of the reasonable suspicion requirement and to the dis-
crimination that its abandonment would permit against citizens of Mexi-
can ancestry. 09 The dissent saw the selective nature of the referrals as
more, rather than less, intrusive because their ethnic basis would engender
a sense of disciimination.110 Curiously, the dissenting opinion also es-
chewed equal protection language. It did, however, express reminiscent
outrage: "That law in this country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as
probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any
circumstances." '
INS agents have eagerly seized upon the Supreme Court's permission
to use race as an indicator of illegal alienage. In United States v. Her-
nandez-Lopez,112 for example, where the driver was stopped for a traffic
violation, agents claimed that their decision to question the passenger "sit-
ting very rigidly in his seat" and "look[ing] like a Mexican cowboy" was
reasonable."' 3 In United States v. Lopez-Barajas,114 agents justified their
stopping a Hispanic disembarking from a plane on the grounds that he
wore two-inch heels, dark green pants, and a blue-and-red-checked shirt,
carried a garment bag, and retreated when a plainclothes agent stared at
him."1 5 In United States v. Urias,116 agents stopped a man of Mexican
ancestry because he turned off from a highway just prior to a checkpoint,
as other aliens had done in the past.11 7 Courts approved those three deten-
tion decisions, but consistently have condemned more extreme reliance on
ethnicity: United States v. Munoz 18 rejected the government's argument
that reasonable suspicion was supplied by two cars traveling in tandem
with a child in each front seat sitting between two Hispanic adults who
failed to look at the agent;"1 9 United States v. Pena-Contu20 held that
adult Hispanic males sitting low in the back seat of a car of a type some-
times used by smugglers were detained improperly; 1 and United States
108. Id.
109. Id. at 569-70, 572-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 573.
111. Id. at 572 n.1.
112. 538 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
113. Id. at 285.
114. 412 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
115. Id. at 1009.
116. 648 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1981).
117. Id. at 622.
118. 604 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1979).
119. Id. at 1161.
120. 639 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1981).
121. Id. at 1228-29.
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v. Mallides222 determined that six Hispanic males sitting "erectly" and
not turning to look at a passing car did not give rise to reasonable
suspicion. 
23
Despite the Supreme Court's cautionary footnote in Martinez-Fuerte,
the INS has not restricted its use of Hispanic appearance to areas near
the Mexican border. The response of the lower courts has been uneven.
IA Georgia, INS agents claimed that the defendant's Hispanic appearance
contributed to their suspicion, but the suppression-hearing court rejected
this claim based upon the 1000 miles separating the suspects and the
Mexican border.12 4 In Chicago, American citizens of Mexican descent ob-
tained an injunction against the INS to protect themselves from its ex-
cesses. The court's order enjoined detention of Hispanics absent "trust-
worthy tips or suspicious behavior," but made no mention of distance
from the border. The plaintiffs' seven-year struggle to secure compliance
from the INS continues.1 25 In New York City, INS agents detained three
innocent Ecuadorian citizens legally residing in the United States and er-
roneously arrested one of them.'26 The Ecuadorians' suit for damages
failed. The court found a reasonable basis for a good faith belief that the
plaintiffs' detention was proper from their ethnicity, their presence in Bay
Ridge (allegedly an area with a fairly high concentration of illegal aliens),
the fact that one of the three was carrying a lunch bag (thereby appearing
to be on the way to work), and the fact that they spoke Spanish to each
other.
127
D. Drug Courier Profiles
The newest and most sophisticated use of race as a factor in probable
cause determinations arises from the "drug courier profiles," developed for
use at airports by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Many aspects of
these profiles, including their inconsistencies,' have generated contro-
122. 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973).
123. Id. at 861. Other examples of unsuccessful INS attempts to use race to justify reasonable
suspicion include United States v. Torres-Urena, 513 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1975) (observation of
Hispanic defendant loading boxes after sunrise at private home near border does not justify seizure);
United States v. Martinez-Tapia, 499 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1974) (observation of Hispanics in
car accelerating on east-west California highway just past direct road leading south "often" used by
smugglers insufficient basis for stop).
124. United States v. Gonzalez-Vargas, 496 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
125. Illinois Migrants Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976), modified, 548
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
126. Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
127. Id. at 103-07.
128. The DEA apparently uses several profiles. See United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036,
1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (contrasting profile before court with one offered in earlier case of United
States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 325-26
(2d Cir. 1979) (noting that profile before court differs from that offered in Sixth Circuit).
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versy. 129 For the most part, however, their racial component has not been
explored. 8'
The precursor of the DEA profiles-the Federal Aviation Agency hi-
jacking profile-did not employ race as a predictive factor.13' In an iso-
lated case in which a supplemental memorandum to security personnel
had added an ethnic element, the reviewing court rejected that element,
noting the lack of an empirical basis and citing "serious equal protection
problems."" 2 In another case approving the use of the FAA profile,
Judge Friendly's concurrence noted the conditional nature of the ap-
proval: "Since all air passengers and their baggage can thus be constitu-
tionally searched, there is no legal objection to searching only some . . .
provided there is no national or racial discrimination without a rational
basis (such as the destination of a particular flight)." 3
The response to race as a profile element has been different in the drug
cases. Although the DEA has refused to commit the entire profile to writ-
ing, the profile clearly contains a racial component. Courts were initially
reluctant even to acknowledge that aspect of the profile, but they have
now approved it.
In 1977, one agent testified that a factor in the profile was "people who
are Hispanics (especially Mexicans)"1 4 and that he had relied on this
factor when arresting the defendants. 13 5 The Eastern District of New
York denied a motion to suppress, apparently comforted that "the govern-
129. The Supreme Court heard two profile cases in 1980, Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441
(1980) (upholding police conduct in airport) (plurality opinion); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 558-59 (1980) (evidence demonstrated that defendant voluntarily consented to search, mak-
ing search constitutional), and a third in 1982, Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (police
officers illegally detained airline passenger without voluntary consent or reasonable suspicion).
Commentary on drug courier profiles is extensive. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, Y. KAmISAR & L. TRIBE,
supra note 27, at 132-43; Note, Drug Courier Profile Stops and the Fourth Amendment: Is the
Supreme Court's Case of Confusion In Its Terminal Stage?, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 217 (1981);
Note, Drug Trafficking at Airports-The Judicial Response, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 91 (1981); Com-
ment, Mendenhall and Reid: The Drug Courier Profile and Investigative Stops, 42 U. Pir. L. REV.
835 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Mendenhall and Reid]; Comment, Criminal Profiles After
United States v. Mendenhall: How Well-Founded A Suspicion?, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 557 [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Criminal Profiles].
130. Two brief Comments regarding the ethnic elements of the profiles have been made. In one,
the author of the Comment declared that one agent's mention of an ethnic element demonstrated that
the agent did not understand the profile. Comment, Mendenhall and Reid, supra note 129, at 842.
The other Comment merely voices a suspicion that race may be a profile element, then concludes that
"an entirely separate equal protection question thus looms large." See Comment, Criminal Profiles,
supra note 129, at 561.
131. See Fenello, Technical Prevention of Air Piracy, 585 INT'L AVIATION 28, 31 n.6 (1971).
132. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
133. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., concurring).
134. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
135. Id. at 693.
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ment did not, in its brief, press this point."13' The court then noted that
"this factor does not tip the [Fourth Amendment] scales.1
137
In several later Second Circuit airport search cases, testimony that the
defendant appeared to be Hispanic prompted no judicial comment. 13  In
his dissent in United States v. Vasquez, 39 Judge Oakes asked for "assur-
ances . . . that the rules were framed and enforced so as not to discrimi-
nate against any particular group on account of race, ethnic background,
or the like." 4" He explained, "One has the uncomfortable impression
here that, but for the Hispanic appearance of Flores and Vasquez, they
might not have been stopped. ' 141 He further reasoned that United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce42 would prohibit the use of race as "an overriding fac-
tor. '1 43 The majority responded to Judge Oakes's objection by character-
izing the claim that Hispanic appearance played an impermissible role as
"ambiguous at best,"144 and promised that any improper police conduct
"must and will be condemned by this Court.1 45 It did not identify what
might constitute "improper police conduct."
Finally, in a more recent-and more forthright-opinion addressing
race and airport stops, the Second Circuit gave its approval:
Gradually various sets of circumstances deemed sufficiently objective
and articulable in combination to justify a reasonable suspicion of
unlawful activity were developed, with courts usually sympathetic
toward upholding investigative stops on the basis of facts that would
normally be viewed as innocent but for characterizations of govern-
ment agents, including. . .[the suspect's] appearing to be a person
of Hispanic background ....
In Michigan, the expected racial characteristics of drug couriers are
different. In United States v. McClain,47 a DEA agent explained that he
too relied upon patterns in drug courier characteristics but that "[ijn the
majority of cases the courier has been a black female. ' 148 The reviewing
court did not comment on this assertion. Perhaps coincidentally, United
136. Id. at 700 n.11.
137. Id.
138. See United States v. Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069, 1070 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 911 (1980); United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1979).
139. 612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980).
140. Id. at 1352 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1352-53.
142. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
143. United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d at 1353 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1346 (majority opinion).
145. Id.
146. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1981).
147. 452 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
148. Id. at 199.
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States v. Mendenhall,249 the first drug courier profile case decided by the
Supreme Court, involved a black female defendant stopped in Detroit,
Michigan. A majority of the Court found inadequate grounds for a
stop;150 race as an explanation for the action was neither pressed by the
government nor discussed by the Court.
E. General Criminal Propensity
There is substantial evidence that many police officers believe minority
race indicates a general propensity to commit crime. The evidence further
suggests the police weigh that belief in their decisions to detain."5 If that
generalization is made explicit, courts uniformly reject it, usually relying
on the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Robinson1 5' dismissed an of-
ficer's claim that a new automobile in a black neighborhood provided a
basis for reasonable suspicion; United States v. Nicholas153 invalidated a
stop based on the supposition that any black driver with out-of-state li-
cense plates was suspicious; and United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola
15
rejected Mexican ancestry as probative of stolen vehicle transportation.
One court responded with a Fourteenth Amendment analysis to a par-
ticularly blatant use of racial propensity. The Pennsylvania State Police
issued a directive to banks, which stated in part:
BANK INFORMATION
Take photos of any black males or females coming into bank who
may look suspicious:
A. Come in to ask directions.
B. Exchange large bills for small money.
C. Come in for no apparent reason.
NOTIFY LOCAL OR STATE POLICE.
1 5 5
In a civil suit by a photographed black customer, the Third Circuit ruled
that these facts stated a cause of action under federal civil rights acts and
149. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
150. The Court sustained the DEA agent's activity only because two justices concluded that Men-
denhall had not been seized, id. at 555-60 (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.), and three justices concluded
that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure, id. at 565-66 (Powell, J., Burger C.J. &
Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. See, e.g., L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 19, at 20-21; M.
WOLFGANG & B. COHEN, CRIME AND RACE 69-72 (1970); Hepburn, Race and the Decision to
Arrest: An Analysis of Warrants Issued, 15 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 54 (1978); Piliavin &
Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 60 AM. J. Soc. 206 (1964); see also Griswold, Police Dis-
crinination: An Elusive Question, 6 J. POLICE Sc. & ADMIN. 61 (1978) (discussing various contra-
dictory findings).
152. 535 F.2d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1976).
153. 448 F.2d 622, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1971).
154. 523 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1975).
155. Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 88 (3d Cir. 1978).
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remanded for trial."' 8 The court distinguished the use of race to identify a
particular perpetrator from this "form of criminal investigation directed
against the plaintiff because of his race," holding that the latter violated
the guarantee of equal protection of the law.
1 7
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CURRENT USES OF RACE
No fact should weigh in the probable cause or reasonable suspicion mix
unless its use satisfies both Fourth Amendment probabilistic constraints
and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection constraints. Judicial accept-
ance of the use of race as a factor which elevates suspicion generally disre-
gards the nature of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, the guaran-
tee of equal protection of the laws, or both.
A. Probabilistic Constraints on the Use of Race
By definition, race cannot affect probable cause or reasonable suspicion
calculations unless it is statistically related to suspected criminal activity.
Nevertheless, courts have approved or disapproved the various uses of race
without requesting evidence on the correlation between race and crime.
1. General Criminal Propensity
To begin, we can ask whether, ceteris paribus, a black or Hispanic (or
Asian or white) person is more likely to engage in crime than is a random
member of the general population. This is a logical place to start, both
because more data have been collected on this question than on several of
the more particularized empirical propositions about race and criminal
activity, and because the conceptual problems introduced here provide a
paradigm for later consideration of the more specialized uses of race.
Certainly, if we consider all kinds of criminal activity, including white-
collar crime, the proportionate involvement of any racial group is specula-
tive. " Arrest records on common law or street crimes-those that the
policeman on the beat would most often consider-show that blacks are
vastly over-represented, although such over-representation has a number
of potential explanations. To the extent that arrest data reflect selection
biases of the criminal justice system, rather than disproportionate involve-
ment,1" considering race in the decision to detain would be illogical and
circular. A second measurement technique, self-report studies, shows
156. Id. at 92.
157. Id. at 91.
158. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 36, at 41-47.
159. See Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc. REv.
93, 94-107 (1978) (discussing studies).
The Yale Law Journal
negligible racial differences in criminal involvement, thus suggesting a se-
lective processing interpretation of the arrest data. 8 Finally, surveys of
victims show disproportionate black involvement as well as biased
processing.1 '
Each of these data sources is methodologically flawed. 2 Consequently,
scholars disagree on the extent to which arrest rates should be attributed
to differential involvement or to differential processing.163 Still, this dis-
pute is not fatal for the use of race as a general indicator of propensity.
Since most experts agree that disproportionate involvement explains some
of the arrest statistic differential, race properly may be considered as a
factor. The problem is that we cannot say with any confidence how much
weight should be attached to it.
Moreover, there may be a "double-counting" problem. Whatever de-
gree of differential involvement exists undoubtedly results in large part
from socio-economic factors."" This in itself would not prohibit the use of
race as a detention factor, at least not as a definitional matter. If, however,
a large share of disproportional involvement is attributable to poverty and
differential association,16 5 race will not predict criminal activity when
those factors are controlled for. Because poverty and differential associa-
tion opportunities probably coincide quite nicely with "crime-prone
neighborhoods," race may add little or no predictive power if a police
officer has already weighed the nature of the neighborhood.
In addition, police may be double counting because they have already
considered the suspiciousness of conduct indicating consciousness of guilt.
There are reasons to believe that race may actually diminish the predictive
power of such observations. Studies show that nonverbal cues, including
eye contact, posture, and body movement, vary among subcultures. 6' Be-
havior that reflects consciousness of guilt among the dominant culture-of
which the officer usually is a member-may reflect only an ethnic differ-
ence when displayed by a minority group member. 67 Thus, for an officer
160. See C. OWENS, MENTAL HEALTH AND BLAcK OFFENDERS (1980); Hindelang, supra note
159, at 94-96; MeNelly & Pope, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crime: A Re-
sponse to Hindelang, 8 REV. BLAcK POL. ECON. 405 (1978).
161. See Hindelang, supra note 159, at 96-97 (summarizing studies).
162. See id. at 97-101 (analyzing victim survey data).
163. See McNelly & Pope, supra note 160, at 405-06.
164. Id. at 407-08.
165. Differential association theory posits that criminality is not primarily caused by biological
deficiency or psychological abnormality, but is learned through association with criminals. With
greater frequency and consistency of association with criminals, a person is more likely to adopt crimi-
nal values and learn criminal techniques. See THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF 206-09 (E. Sutherland ed.
1937); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 240-63 (Yale Univ. ed. 1983).
166. See M. ARGYLE, BODILY COMMUNICATION 73-105 (1975); E. HALL, THE HIDDEN DI-
MENSION (1966); E. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959); Ekman, Universal and Cultural Differ-
ences in Facial Expressions of Emotion, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION (1972).
167. See Cassata, Nonverbal Behavior and Law Enforcement: The Hidden Cues, 6 J. PoLIcE
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to "add" the predictive power of race to the predictive power of a furtive
gesture may be illogical; minority race may actually subtract from the pre-
dictive value of the furtive gesture.
One recent study found that blacks are disproportionately the victims of
arrests not supported by probable cause.1 68 Whatever the general predic-
tive power of race, this study suggests that, for various reasons, police
overestimate it. Although probabilistic constraints may not preclude con-
sideration of general racial propensities to commit crime, they clearly mil-
itate against according them substantial weight.
2. Identification of a Particular Offender
When race is used merely as an element in the description of a particu-
lar perpetrator, of course, no probabilistic problems occur. The proposi-
tion that more congruent details increase the likelihood of identity between
suspect and perpetrator seems indisputable. Such self-evident propositions
do not require statistical proof since probable cause is a "common sense"
concept.""'
3. Illegal Aliens
The use of race as a detention factor in suspected immigration law vio-
lations also generally complies with probabilistic constraints. The Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) collects extensive statistics on
illegal aliens and has presented them to the courts. These statistics show
that although Hispanics are only a small fraction of the total population
of the United States, more than eighty-five percent of arrested aliens are
of Mexican descent.17 0 Selective processing may explain some of the dis-
proportionate arrest rate, but no one denies that the bulk of the discrep-
ancy results from differential involvement.
One conceptual difficulty not resolved by the otherwise compelling INS
statistics is whether Hispanic appearance adds to the suspicion prompted
by "furtive gestures." Perhaps as a result of cultural differences, white
agents may perceive normal Hispanic behavior and body movements as
guilt-ridden. In light of the heavy reliance placed upon furtive gestures in
many immigration cases, testimony on cultural differences-or the lack
thereof-seems desirable.
171
Sci. & AD. 10, 14-16 (1978).
168. See Hepburn, supra note 151, at 59, 66.
169. See supra pp. 217-19.
170. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 901 (1975) (appendix to opinion of Burger, C.J.).
171. Evidence of such cultural differences might suggest that courts should reject the probative
value of the "furtive gestures" rather than the probative value of race.
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4. Drug Courier Profiles
In contrast to the extensive documentation from the INS, no data have
been offered to support drug courier profiles. Because the DEA has not
released the statistics upon which its profile is based, courts have no basis
for determining either the statistical significance or the strength of the as-
serted correlation between race and drug courier activity. Should the DEA
reveal its arrest statistics, courts still would not know whether those statis-
tics reflected racially selective investigation by the DEA or the asserted
disproportionate racial involvement. Unless the DEA provides corroborat-
ing self-report or victimization studies for narcotics traffic, attribution
of any differences in arrest rates to differential involvement would be un-
warranted. Indeed, there is some support for the alternative hypothesis
that arrest rates reflect racially selective processing. That some agents
have observed the couriers to be predominantly Hispanic, while others
have observed them to be almost exclusively black females, suggests a self-
fulfilling prophecy."' Agents who look for Hispanic drug couriers find
them, and agents who lie in wait for black females do not arrest white
males. Of course, these are not insuperable barriers. If the data are as
compelling as the DEA would like the courts to believe, the ethnic ele-
ment in drug courier profiles may satisfy probabilistic constraints. But
unless and until the government provides such data, courts should ignore
race when assessing the justification for the detention of a suspected drug
courier.
5. Incongruity
Assertions that racial incongruity increases suspicion create even greater
tension with the concepts of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. In
most incongruity cases, an officer will testify simply that persons of the
suspect's race are rarely seen in the neighborhood in which the suspect
was found. Because the infrequency of an event reveals nothing about its
correlation with criminal activity, such testimony is irrelevant to a deter-
mination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
172. One commentator has observed:
The police's propensity to regard the culturally different with suspicion fosters sharper and
increased surveillance of cultural minorities and minority communities. Police stereotyping of
cultural minorities not only increases the suspicion and surveillance, but also serves as a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Thus when the police note, in statistical reports, that the arrest incidence
of Indians for offenses involving drunkenness is several times that for the United States as a
whole, they are more prone to look for evidence of drunkenness in cases involving Indians and
to see sufficient evidence to warrant arrest.
Swett, Cultural Bias in the American Legal System, 4 LAw & Soc'y REv. 79, 93 (1969) (citations
omitted).
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More complex are incongruity cases in which the officer further testifies
that most (or all) persons of the suspect's race appearing in that neighbor-
hood were engaged in illegal activity. If the officer has observed only one
other black person in the area and that person was committing a crime,
his isolated observation may be a fluke; the sample size is too small to
conclude that the correlation is not spurious. An inference of predictive
power would be justified only when the arresting officer testifies to obser-
vations (his own or those of fellow officers) that are sufficiently numerous
to reveal a pattern. When this condition is met, probabilistic constraints
are satisfied.
B. Equal Protection Constraints
Whether or not the use of race in detention decisions is consistent with
the goals of the Fourth Amendment, it also must be tested against the
stringent standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. Racial classifications
are subject to "the most rigid scrutiny, ' 173 and demand a "very heavy
burden of justification.''1 74 If this scrutiny is directed at the expanding use
of race as a factor in probable cause and reasonable suspicion determina-
tions, one can only conclude that factual guilt has blinded many courts to
equal protection violations.
1. The Purposefulness of Detention Decisions Based on Race.
That detention decisions are made by police officers and evaluated by
courts does not insulate them from equal protection scrutiny: Executive,
175
administrative, 17  and judicially enforced private17 7 classifications based
upon race are subject to the same constraints as those promulgated by
legislatures.
Most cases involving executive or administrative classifications have
concerned facially neutral policies alleged to be discriminatory in effect. In
these "disproportionate impact" cases, the Supreme Court has stressed
that "the invidious quality of a [government action] claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
173. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (invalidating exclusion of blacks from
juries).
174. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (striking down anti-miscegenation statute).
175. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (military order excluding all persons of
Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast areas); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) (West Coast curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry).
176. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (municipal ordinance prescribing kind of
building in which laundries may be located).
177. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (restrictive covenant excluding persons of desig-
nated races from owning or occupying real property).
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pose."17 8 A showing of animus supplies the "discriminatory purpose" in
cases alleging disproportionate impact, but this showing is necessary only
because the statute or regulation is facially neutral. When governmental
action on its face disadvantages racial or ancestral minorities, this is by
definition "discriminatory" regardless of the purported motivation;"" no
Supreme Court precedent or dictum concerning an explicit classification
disadvantaging a racial minority requires proof of illicit or irrational mo-
tivation to trigger strict scrutiny.' 8 '
Nevertheless, the government's argument in Martinez-Fuerte'81 and
Brignoni-Ponce'82 assumed that administrative classifications required
proof of racial hostility before strict scrutiny would be invoked. 83 The
only commentary on these cases considering the equal protection issue
agrees that lack of racial animus renders the use of race "nondiscrimina-
tory.""8 Were this view correct, no statistically supported use of race in
detention decisions would be subject to strict scrutiny. The motive for its
use would not be racial hostility, but effective law enforcement. This read-
ing not only misconstrues the Court's "discriminatory purpose" require-
ment; it stands the history of the equal protectiofn clause on its head. Be-
cause a primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to free blacks
from stereotypes, prompted by a history of disadvantage and slavery that
ignored the qualities of the individual, it would be astonishing if accurate
stereotypes foreclosed heightened judicial scrutiny. Legitimate purposes
and their statistical support may be relevant to the constitutionality of ex-
plicit racial classifications, but only as they contribute to meeting "the
heavy burden of justification," not as to whether that burden should be
imposed.
a. Identification of a Particular Offender
The appropriateness of heightened judicial scrutiny depends upon how
race is used in detention decisions. The use of race to identify a particular
perpetrator, for example, does not disadvantage any racial group and thus
178. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1944).
179. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct. 3187, 3202-03 (1982).
180. Id.
181. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
182. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
183. See supra p. 232. This also seems to be the view taken by the district court in United States
v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), discussed supra p. 234. The court stressed that the
"ethnic element" of the altered profile employed by the airline was not statistically supported and
implied that it was this irrationality that raised the equal protection issues. Id. at 1101.
184. See Note, Minority Groups and the Fourth Amendment Standard of Certitude: United
States v. Ortiz and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 733, 735 n.10
(1976).
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does not require strict scrutiny. Although the suspect's race is noted and
weighed in the decision to detain, no generalizations about the character-
istics, behavior, or appropriate treatment of the racial group are em-
ployed. Rather, the suspect's race is used solely to help substantiate his
identity as the individual involved in a particular offense. Because suspects
in all racial groups will be identified in part by their race, reliance upon
the witness's description of the perpetrator's race seems to impose equal
burdens on all races.
Absent discriminatory effects, provisions for racial designations do not
require strict scrutiny."8 5 At least in theory, the use of race to help iden-
tify a particular perpetrator is neutral in both design and effect."' 6 Only if
the racial description of particular perpetrators is used disingenuously (for
example, as an excuse for law enforcement officers to "hassle" members of
a disfavored racial group) would a disadvantaging racial classification be
at issue and strict scrutiny be required.
b. Illegal Aliens, Drug Courier Profiles, and General Criminal
Propensity
The three other uses of race in decisions to detain indisputably involve
facially discriminatory classifications, however, and should be subject to
strict scrutiny. First, the INS's reliance on Hispanic appearance in the
illegal alien cases intentionally singles out Hispanics as a group. Second,
the DEA's reliance on race in drug courier cases singles out Hispanics as
a group when they travel in New York, and blacks as a group when they
travel in Michigan. Third, the disapproved police practice of relying on
race as a factor in street crime detentions disadvantages blacks as a group.
That race is only one factor in these detention decisions does not alter the
equal protection analysis." 7 Because an explicit racial classification con-
tributes to the decision to impose a substantial unpleasant consequence,188
strict scrutiny is required.
185. When a state statute requiring recitation of the spouses' race in divorce decrees was chal-
lenged, the Supreme Court upheld it. The district court had stated that "the securing and chronicling
of racial datafor identification or statistical use violates no constitutional privilege." Hamm v. Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va.) (emphasis added), aff'd per curiam
sub nor. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
186. But cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403 (1964) (striking down Louisiana statute
requiring designation of candidates' race on nomination petitions and ballots because it encouraged
voting along racial lines).
187. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977) (if race is a motivating factor in decision then choice presumed to be illegitimate).
188. Even the limited intrusion of a stop and frisk involves more than de minimis consequences:
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person. . . . Moreover, it is simply fantastic to
urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands help-
less, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty indignity." It is a serious intru-
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c. Incongruity
Finally, the use of racial incongruity should be subject to strict scrutiny.
Racial incongruity is particularly troublesome because its justification re-
calls the rationale for segregatory legislation: Segregation does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposes symmetrical burdens on
each group. 89 The use of racial incongruity is purportedly justified be-
cause blacks face increased suspicion if they venture into white neighbor-
hoods while whites face increased suspicion if they venture into black
neighborhoods.
Until 1954, the "separate but equal" vision of Plessy v. Ferguson sanc-
tioned most reciprocal restrictions.190 Brown v. Board of Education's1911
rejection of segregated schools foreshadowed the total rejection of the sym-
metrical burden doctrine. McLaughlin v. Florida192 overturned a state
law forbidding interracial cohabitation. The Court stated:
Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, does
not end with a showing of equal application among the members of
the class defined by the legislation. The courts 'must reach and deter-
mine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are
reasonable in light of its purpose-in this case, whether there is an
arbitrary or invidious discrimination between those classes covered
by Florida's cohabitation law and those excluded.19
Such a law could be upheld only if it was necessarily-not merely ration-
ally-related to the achievement of a valid state interest."" McLaughlin,
however, reserved the question of whether prevention of miscegenation
was a legitimate state purpose. In Loving v. Virginia,19 5 the Court re-
sponded to a direct challenge of a law forbidding interracial marriages:
The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by
members of different races. Over the years, this Court has consis-
tently repudiated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions
sion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong re-
sentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
189. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (applying separate but equal rationale
to segregation of public transportation facilities).
190. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1899) (applying
Plessy to segregated education); see generally C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(3d ed. 1974) (discussing history of legalized segregation in the South).
191. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
192. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
193. Id. at 191.
194. Id. at 196.
195. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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are founded upon the doctrine of equality." . . . We have consis-
tently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the
rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifica-
tions violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."9 6
Using race to justify detaining blacks in white neighborhoods and whites
in black neighborhoods seems to fall within the prohibition of McLaugh-
lin and Loving. The substantive rights at issue are again associational.
McLaughlin concerned the persons with whom one lived, Loving involved
the person whom one married, and deeming race suspicious in a neighbor-
hood concerns the persons one visits.
There are differences, of course. Both Loving and McLaughlin involved
racial classifications in a criminal statute, which are "especially suspect"
state action.1 97 In addition, the laws overturned in Loving and McLaugh-
lin were obviously "designed to maintain White Supremacy."198 Never-
theless, using racial incongruity as a factor in determining probable cause
should also be subject to strict scrutiny. Although this use of race may be
superficially neutral, it functions in practice to disadvantage minorities.
Because there are far more predominantly white than predominantly
black neighborhoods, a black person has many fewer areas in which he
may travel without prompting suspicion and possible detention. Further-
more, because many black neighborhoods are poor, have limited public
recreation facilities, and have higher crime rates than white neighbor-
hoods, it would be unusual for a white person to want to enter many of
these neighborhoods except to visit a particular person. It would be much
more likely that a black person would want to enter a white area, many of
which are aesthetically pleasant, contain the most desirable public recrea-
tion facilities, and benefit from better public safety services. Thus, blacks
would be detained because their race was "out of place" more often than
would whites, and blacks would be inhibited in their choices of where to
travel more often than would whites.
Even if it were not more burdensome to blacks than to whites, police
action based upon racial incongruity should invoke strict scrutiny because
it fosters racial separation. Stopping blacks in white neighborhoods and
whites in black neighborhoods when their conduct alone does not justify
detention will discourage people from socializing or living outside their
own racial group, possibly conveying social stigma and fostering stereo-
types. "Few principles of law are more firmly stitched into our constitu-
196. Id. at 11-12.
197. Id. at 11.
198. Id.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 214, 1983
tional fabric than the proposition that a State must not discriminate
against a person because of his race or the race of his companions, or in
any way act to compel or encourage racial segregation."19 Public observa-
tion of police actions clearly influenced by "out of place" racial minorities
will deter interracial socialization. Allowing police to stop blacks in
predominantly white neighborhoods will also deter residential integration.
It will send an implicit message to blacks that their decision to live in
previously white areas is unwelcome.
2. Application of the Strict Scrutiny Standard
With the exception of race as an identifying feature, therefore, each of
the uses of race as a factor in the decision to detain should be subjected to
the most searching scrutiny. Such examination does not compel a finding
of unconstitutionality, but as Professor Gunther neatly put it, such scru-
tiny is "strict" in theory and "fatal" in fact.200
The Supreme Court has only once upheld an explicit non-remedial ra-
cial classification to which it had applied strict scrutiny.2 10 In Korematsu
v. United States,202 the Court sustained a military order excluding persons
of Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast areas after Pearl Har-
bor. Justice Black's analysis required a "[p]ressing public necessity" to
justify a racial classification.2"s He found that necessity in the military
authority's belief that an unascertained number of Japanese-Americans
were disloyal and had to be immobilized immediately.2 '" The exclusion
was justified
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the prop-
erly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because
199. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970) (emphasis added) (finding that
such discrimination might be involved in arrest of white woman participating in sit-in at lunch
counter); see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (granting standing
to sue to white tenants when discriminatory renting practices deny them benefits of living in inte-
grated community).
200. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Termn-Foreuord: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
201. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding 10% set-aside of construction
funds for minority businesses).
The classifications at issue in this Article are certainly not remedial. Nor can they be considered
"benign" in a more general way, given widespread minority hostility toward the police. See Jacobs &
Cohen, The Impact of Radal Integration on the Police, 6 J. POLICE ScI. & AD. 168, 168-71 (1978)
(reviewing literature on black sentiment toward police).
202. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding
earlier West Coast military curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry without explicating standard of
review).
203. 323 U.S. at 216.
204. Id. at 218-19.
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they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that
all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in
this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it
must-determined that they should have the power to do just this.205
Three Justices dissented,2"' and Korematsu has since been excoriated
by many.207 Whether or not Korematsu simply sanctioned congressional
prejudice or was justified by military exigencies, none of the uses of race
as a factor in detention decisions is analogous. Neither the military ur-
gency of wartime nor the imprimatur of Congress justifies acceptance of
the classifications at issue in detention decisions.
a. The Compelling State Interest Requirement
Korematsu's focus on the importance of the ends served by a racial
classification has often been reiterated.20 8 The law enforcement interests at
stake in detention decisions cannot meet Korematsu's "pressing public ne-
cessity" standard or its modern equivalent, the "compelling state interest"
requirement.
A determination of compelling state interest requires an examination, of
the alternatives to the practice under scrutiny. In many detention deci-
sions, the alternative to partial reliance on race is continued police surveil-
lance. That surveillance will often uncover additional, non-invidious rea-
sons for suspicion. Police must tolerate the consequent delay and
diminished efficiency; administrative convenience can never provide the
requisite compelling state interest.20 9 When non-invidious predictors are
205. Id. at 223.
206. Id. at 225-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233-42, (Murphy, J., dissenting); and id. at
242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE: JAPANESE EVACUA-
TION (1949); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945); Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and
Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 414 (1943); Rostow, TheJapanese
American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
339 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (defending Korematsu).
208. In McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), for example, Justice White's majority opin-
ion looked for evidence of "some overriding statutory purpose requiring the [racial classifica-
tion]. . . ." Id. at 192. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Chief Justice Warren found "no
legitimate overriding purpose." Id. at 11. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), noted that racial
classifications must be "necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest." Id. at 447 n.7
(emphasis in original). More recently, opinions on both sides of the dispute about racial classifications
designed to remedy past discrimination have assumed that non-remedial racial classifications are valid
only in the presence of a compelling state interesi. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (compelling state interest required for all racial classifications) with
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357, 361 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.) ("compelling governmental purpose" required for racial classifications which stigma-
tize, but "important governmental objective" sufficient to justify remedial racial classifications).
209. Cf Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (administrative con-
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available, there can be no compelling state interest in using racial
classifications. 10
Where no non-invidious information is discovered, disregard for the
predictive value of race will result in no detention, either because no fur-
ther observation is possible or because further observation reveals only
innocuous information. In some of these cases, the "loss" of a stop or
arrest is a gain. The police will observe no further suspicious factors be-
cause there is no underlying illegal activity. In other cases, a guilty person
will remain at large because race is not used. With the exception of the
illegal alien cases, the government has not documented either the relative
frequency of these two situations or the absolute frequency of the latter
situation. In my estimation, the number of guilty drug couriers, black
street criminals, or racially out-of-place suspects who will permanently
escape police intervention if race is not considered in detention decisions
will be small indeed. Conversely, I believe that a large number of innocent
minority-group members will be saved from harassment stemming from
an exaggerated sense of the predictive power of race.211 Because "the
heavy burden of justification" falls on the government, an unsubstantiated
and speculative interest in law enforcement cannot be counted as a com-
pelling state interest.
Immigration laws, of course, are distinguished by the strength of the
data amassed by the INS. Although only a small fraction of the popula-
tion is Hispanic, eighty-five percent of illegal aliens are Hispanic.
212
These numbers permit the inference that the elimination of race as a pro-
bative factor would result in a significant reduction in the number of ar-
rests of illegal aliens. The inference is not unassailable because we do not
know the proportion of cases in which continued surveillance would un-
cover other predictive factors justifying detention. However, if the INS's
use of Hispanic appearance is limited to areas near the Mexican border,
as the Court's opinion in Martinez-Fuerte suggested it should be,218 then
venience alone cannot justify dissimilar treatment of men and women); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76-77 (1971) (same).
210. The experience of those who construct predictors for parole success is instructive. Peter Hoff-
man, principal designer of the federal parole guidelines, asserts that when an inmate's prior criminal
record and other non-racial factors are used to predict criminal recidivism, race adds very little predic-
tive power. See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J.
810, 877 n.329 (1975); see also Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Indihidualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1434-36 (1979) (criticizing
use of race as predictive factor because of inaccuracy, cumulative discriminatory effect, and threat to
individual autonomy).
211. For one man's story of repeated police abuse of race as a detention factor, see Lawson v.
Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).
212. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 901 (1975) (appendix to opinion of Burger, C.J.).
213. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559-64 (1976).
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we can reasonably assume that there are too many "suspicious" Hispanics
to make continued observation of all of them possible.
But proof that elimination of this racial classification would substan-
tially (or even drastically) reduce arrests of illegal aliens clears only the
first hurdle. The government must further prove that increasing the num-
ber of arrests promotes a pressing public necessity. This it cannot do. It is
not clear that the hordes of aliens who cross our borders injure the domes-
tic economy.2" 4 Even if illegal migration does result in job losses for the
domestic labor force or increased social welfare expenditures, elimination
of those injuries is not even remotely as compelling as the prevention of
sabotage during wartime, the one justification that the Court has accepted
for using explicit racial classifications. Finally, the use of race in detention
decisions has woefully failed to prevent these injuries.2"5 In light of this
failure, the government's neglect of other means to curb illegal immigra-
tion casts doubt on the sincerity of any claim that a compelling interest is
involved. For example, although the dominant incentive for illegal entry is
the availability of employment, the government does not prohibit the em-
ployment of illegal aliens.2"' The government could also increase the line
watch personnel who cover the border itself and stop all persons who
cross from one zone into the other.217 The courts certainly should not con-
sider a governmental interest compelling until the government itself does.
b. The Necessary Means Requirement
In conventional equal protection analysis, we could stop after finding
the governmental interests advanced by the discrimination to be less than
compelling. Although strict scrutiny further demands a "necessary" or
"precisely tailored" means,21" investigation of the fit between means and
ends is unnecessary if the end is not a compelling governmental interest.
Despite the Court's statement of the ends and means requirements as
conjunctive, a few commentators have argued that the strict scrutiny stan-
dard should focus only on the fit between ends and means:
[T]he goal served by the classification need only be permissible, not
214. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982) ("There is no evidence in the record suggesting
that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's economy. To the contrary, the avail-
able evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to
the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.").
215. Id. at 218 n.17 (estimate by Attorney General of between three million and six million
illegal aliens in United States).
216. Id. at 218-19.
217. But see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 908 (1975) (appendix to opinion of Burger,
C.J.) (arguing that increased manpower would not increase effectiveness of line watch and Border
Patrol).
218. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
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compelling. Thus, if the classification is perfect [or justified in its
imperfections by exigent circumstances], the reviewing court should
not proceed to inquire into how compelling the asserted state interest
is. Although some might think such substantive testing desirable, the
Court does not appear in its holdings to have committed itself to test
for a compelling state interest. 2 9
In this view, Korematsu permitted an imperfect classification only because
the exigencies of war precluded a perfect classification.
The ultimate outcome of this debate, however, will not affect the use of
race in detention decisions. A doctrinal shift in emphasis from the nature
of the interest to the perfection of the classification may facilitate an ex-
pansion of the number of suspect classifications, 220 but it will not alter the
analysis of most racial classifications. In a racially heterogenous society, it
is hard to imagine a social phenomenon that may be perfectly identified
with race.221 If there is one, it certainly is not crime. Even the use of
Hispanic appearance to increase suspicion of illegal alien status is sub-
stantially underinclusive and substantially overinclusive.222 Thus, whether
the strict scrutiny test properly requires both a compelling state interest
and a perfectly tailored classification or only the latter, the four dis-
advantaging classifications I have discussed fail that test. With the excep-
tion of the use of race as an identifying feature of a particular perpetrator,
which does not involve a disadvantaging classification, reliance on race in
detention decisions violates the guarantee of the equal protection of the
laws.
223
219. Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1251 (1974); see Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolfr A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933-37 (1973).
220. Professor Gunther has argued that the Burger Court's reluctance to add to the number of
suspect classifications stems from its desire to avoid assessment of how compelling an asserted interest
is. See Gunther, supra note 200, at 21-22. Professor Ely advocates a permissible interest/perfect
classification standard in conjunction with an argument that sex should be made a suspect classifica-
tion. See Ely, supra note 219, at 933-37.
221. Racial classifications may be more accurate where physiological traits are involved. For ex-
ample, three-tenths of one percent of the American black population suffers from sickle cell anemia, a
serious hereditary disease. About nine percent of the black population carries the recessive gene while
the incidence of the trait in the white population is negligible. Proposals to require only blacks to
undergo sickle cell screening would therefore avoid either substantial over- or under-inclusiveness. See
Note, Constitutional and Practical Considerations in Mandatory Sickle Cell Anemia Testing, 7
U.C.D. L. REV. 509 (1974); cf. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Ne-
gro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 383 (1966) (regulation aimed at
color rather than race might satisfy standard; e.g., state could require persons with dark skin to wear
light-colored item of clothing when walking on road at night).
222. By INS figures, 10% to 15% of illegal aliens are not Hispanic, so using race to identify
violators is substantially underinclusive. It is also grossly overinclusive, since even in border areas,
only a small proportion of Hispanics are illegal aliens. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 886 & n.12 (1975).
223. I am not arguing here that racial prejudice influencing an objectively justifiable decision
should, if discovered, invalidate an arrest and require suppression of its fruits. Fourth Amendment
case law is replete with examples of the principle that neither good faith nor sound reasoning is
250
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IV. APPLICATIONS TO OTHER DUBIOUS DETENTION CRITERIA
I have focused on racial factors in the detention decision because I find
them most offensive. The various uses of race provide compelling exam-
ples of how casually both probabilistic and equal protection constraints
are violated. They also counsel skepticism about the legitimacy of several
other detention criteria.
A. Probabilistic Constraints
The first lesson from the analysis of race and detention concerns the
predictive power of personal characteristics of the suspect. Courts should
ignore police testimony that certain kinds of people are crime-prone ab-
sent evidence of such propensity. That the suspect looks like a "hippie"22'
may be probative of criminal activity, but it may also be a vague and
baseless stereotype. Similarly, that a suspect is incongruous with his sur-
roundings should not be equated with increased likelihood of criminal ac-
tivity. A well-dressed man in a shabby area, a stranger in a high-crime
neighborhood, 25 or a driver proceeding slowly in a rural area as if unfa-
miliar with the area, 26 may be more likely to commit a crime than the
typical resident, but he may merely be a victim of xenophobia. The police
reflect societal prejudices, often magnified by the effects of self-fulfilling
prophecies.227 Courts should ask for evidence supporting such generaliza-
tions; for judges to rely on assumed police "expertise" is irresponsible.
required of a police officer if objective justification for his actions is present. See, e.g., Washington v.
Chrisman, 102 S. Ct. 812 (1982) (where officer could have entered room to prevent defendant's es-
cape, search and seizure held valid); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (supervisory
power of federal court does not extend to excluding evidence obtained by Government through delib-
erate bad faith violations of one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to secure evidence against
another person); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1978) (evaluation of compliance with
wiretapping minimization requirement valid if "objectively reasonable," whether or not agents made
any attempt to comply with requirement). This principle has frequently been attacked. See, e.g.,
Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal
Law, 1973 U. ILL L.F. 88; Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 717; Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLuM. L.
REv. 1103 (1961); Note, Discriminatory Law Enforcement and Equal Protection From the Law, 59
YALE L.J. 354 (1950). Nonetheless, it is well-established and poses different issues than does the
reliance on race to justify an otherwise illegal detention.
224. See United States v. Sherman, 430 F.2d 1402, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1970). The police officer
may be referring to glazed eyes, needle marks, or other objective physical factors that indicate drug
use. But he may also be referring to unconventional dress, which has no apparent probative value.
225. See State v. Smith, 347 So. 2d 1127, 1128-29 (La. 1977).
226. See United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 454 (9th Cir.) (police search of vehicle proceed-
ing slowly in rural area reasonable), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1010 (1975); cf. United States v. Nicholas,
448 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1971) (out-of-state license plate by itself does not indicate criminal
activity).
227. See supra note 172.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 214, 1983
B. Equal Protection Constraints
The second lesson we should learn from the example of race is that
detention decisions should be constrained by more than probabilistic con-
cerns. 228 Two other common factors in the decision to detain involve clas-
sifications that may call for close equal protection scrutiny.
1. Gender
Gender classifications require an intermediate standard of review. They
must "serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives. '2 9 Gender is used as a fac-
tor in the decision to detain in at least three ways. The first use, as an
identifying characteristic of a particular perpetrator, requires no special
scrutiny because it is not a disadvantaging gender classification.230
The second use assumes a greater male propensity to commit crime; a
man following a little old lady seems more dangerous than a woman doing
the same thing. Detection of these propensity arguments requires some
sensitivity, for they will rarely be as explicit as propensity arguments
based upon race.231 Courts must therefore question whether they would
find probable cause or reasonable suspicion if the defendant were of the
opposite sex. If they would not, then heightened scrutiny is required.
232
228. In addition to viewing race as a suspect classification, the Court has also declared classifica-
tions based on alienage to be suspect. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (stat-
utes denying welfare benefits to aliens violate equal protection clause; classifications based on alienage
subject to strict scrutiny). The current status of alienage as a suspect classification is tempered by a
generously construed exception for the "execution of broad public policy." See Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 72-80 (1979) (upholding New York statute forbidding permanent teacher certification of
aliens); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1978) (statute limiting police force membership to
U.S. citizens does not violate equal protection clause). This "public policy" exception seems irrelevant
to detention cases.
Although alienage is considered in detentions for suspected violations of the immigration laws, this
use does not require strict scrutiny because it clearly and directly falls within "the paramount federal
power over immigration and naturalization." Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 99-101
(1976) (invalidating as not within paramount federal power civil service regulation barring resident
aliens from employment).
I am aware of no case involving the use of alienage as a factor in establishing probable cause in
circumstances unrelated to immigration. Were a police officer so to assert it as an aspect of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, the suppression hearing court should subject it to the same analysis
proposed for race.
229. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (striking down gender-based drinking age).
230. Cf. supra pp. 225-26, 239 (analyzing use of race as identifying feature). For the police to
stop only men when looking for a rapist is not a gender classification even if the victim did not say
that a male raped her; biological differences make masculinity an implicit part of the description.
231. Normal patterns of speech require the police, when speaking of the suspect, to recount what
"he" or "she" was doing. The suppression hearing court may respond to prevailing stereotypes, yet
not convey this reliance in its opinion since it too will "naturally" use male and female pronouns.
232. See Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31
(1982) (suggesting that test should be whether same decision would be made if disproportionate im-
pact fell on non-disadvantaged group).
252
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The consequence of heightened scrutiny is not immediately obvious. An
"important" government interest admittedly is at stake, but is the gender
classification "substantially related" to the objective of crime detection?
Perhaps this should depend upon the statistical fit between the gender
classification and the specific crime suspected. For sexual assault, the cor-
relation would be extremely high,"3' but for nonviolent crimes, it would
be much weaker.
234
The third use of gender in detention decisions involves incongruity. A
teen-age boy hanging around a park with little children is suspicious, 35
as is a man carrying a woman's purse or overnight case.2 36 Certainly,
these incongruities are rationally related to the likelihood that crime is
afoot. But it is quite clear that these classifications do not impose equal
burdens on both sexes; police do not suspect women of criminal activity
when they express interest in typically male pursuits nor do they suspect
criminal activity from a woman's wearing typically masculine apparel. In
addition, use of gender incongruity as a detention factor might perpetuate
traditional roles, just as the use of racial incongruity deters integration.
Again, the results of heightened scrutiny are not indisputable. It might be
necessary to distinguish subsets based upon the strength of the correlation
between crime and the specific gender-incongruous conduct.
2. Wealth
The other common probable cause/reasonable suspicion factor that may
intensify equal protection scrutiny is wealth. Police have asserted that
they suspected the defendant because he was well dressed but in a "bad"
neighborhood," 7 was shabbily dressed in a wealthy neighborhood, 38 or
appeared to be poor (because of his location or residence or apparel) and
was carrying an expensive item.239 All of these factors reflect a wealth
classification. Dicta from the Warren Court implied that wealth classifica-
233. See United States v. Wickizer, 465 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1972) (observation of two
young girls in parked car with two men in area where several rapes occurred justified stop).
234. The correlation between prostitution and female gender, although obviously not absolute, is
probably strong.
235. See Swett, supra note 172, at 85 (pointing opt that such person might either be relative of
child or molester).
236. See People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 589, 408 N.E.2d 908, 912, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 583
(carrying of woman's vanity case an equivocal fact), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980); People v.
Davis, 36 N.Y.2d 280, 282, 326 N.E.2d 818, 819, 367 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257-58 (man's carrying
woman's purse is not suspicious enough to justify arrest), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
237. See United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049, 1050-51 (3d Cir. 1972) (well-dressed man in
public housing).
238. See Racine v. State, 51 Ala. App. 484, 485-87, 286 So. 2d 890, 891-94 (1973) (persons with
unkempt hair in old car with loud muffler in upper class neighborhood).
239. United States v. Robinson, 535 F.2d 881, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1976) (police stop of new car
resembling police vehicle in poor black area).
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tions were suspect,24° but this position has been repudiated. 241 Justice
Marshall's compromise plea for heightened scrutiny 42  has been
ignored.243
The Burger Court's minimal scrutiny approach, however, evolved from
consideration of de facto wealth classifications, 244 rather than de jure clas-
sifications, such as those at issue in detention decisions. As pointed out by
Professor Michelman at the end of the Warren Court's era, expanding
suspect classification analysis to include de facto wealth classifications
would have conflicted with deeply entrenched "free market" values.2 45
The difficulties inherent in condemning the market process do not, how-
ever, constrain review of de jure wealth discrimination.246 The disparag-
ing term "invidious" seems appropriate for de jure wealth classifications,
240. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) ("careful
examination. . . especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race. . . two
factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more
exacting judicial scrutiny"); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Lines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, . . . are traditionally disfavored.").
241. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) (implying that wealth classifications, un-
like racial classifications, are not suspect).
242. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting):
That wealth classifications alone have not necessarily been considered to bear the same high
degree of suspectness as have classifications based on, for instance, race or alienage may be
explainable on a number of grounds. The "poor" may not be seen as politically powerless as
certain discrete and insular minority groups. Personal poverty may entail much the same social
stigma as historically attached to certain racial or ethnic groups. But personal poverty is not a
permanent disability; its shackles may be escaped. Perhaps most importantly, though, personal
wealth may not necessarily share the general irrelevance as a basis for legislative action that
race or nationality is recognized to have. While the "poor" have frequently been a legally
disadvantaged group, it cannot be ignored that social legislation must frequently take cogni-
zance of the economic status of our citizens. Thus, we have generally gauged the invidiousness
of wealth classifications with an awareness of the importance of the interests being affected and
the relevance of personal wealth to those interests.
243. 411 U.S. at 18-28.
244. See generally id. (upholding local property tax financing of education where substantial in-
terdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulted from differences in taxable property values
among the districts); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding California's constitutional
requirement that low-rent housing projects have prior approval by local referenda). In Valtierra, the
majority saw no discrimination against the poor since low-income public housing was not the only
government expenditure subject to referenda, id. at 142; the dissent asserted that this was facial dis-
crimination on the basis of poverty, id. at 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
245. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 27-28 (1969):
[U]nlike a de facto racial classification which usually must seek its justifications in purposes
completely distinct from its race-related impacts, a de facto pecuniary classification typically
carries a highly persuasive justification inseparable from the very effect which excites antipa-
thy-i.e., the hard choices it forces upon the financially straitened. For the typical form as-
sumed by such a classification is simply the charging of a price, reasonably approximating cost,
for some good or service which the complaining person may freely choose to purchase or not to
purchase. . . . We usually regard it as both the fairest and most efficient arrangement to
require each consumer to pay the full market price of what he consumes, limiting his con-
sumption to what his income permits.
246. See id. at 28-29 (de jure wealth discrimination should require adequate justification).
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because with no market justification, they resemble racial classifications in
their suggestion of oppression and stigma. Moreover, heightened scrutiny
for explicit wealth discrimination in detention decisions is not foreclosed.
Earlier cases struck down de jure wealth classifications, albeit on other
grounds, and no recent case has presented the issue. Defense attor-
neys-and courts-should therefore consider an objection of invidious dis-
crimination in those detentions where economic class propensity or incon-
gruity is alleged to have increased suspicion.
I have only sketched concern about two additional semi-suspect factors.
It may be that close analysis of these "dubious" factors will validate one
or both, or validate them in some contexts. My point is that empirical
relationship to criminal activity is only the first inquiry. The second in-
quiry must balance the revealed law enforcement interests against other
constitutionally enshrined values.
C. Policy Constraints
Finally, I think that the sharp dichotomy between competent trial evi-
dence and competent suppression hearing evidence is misguided. The pos-
sibility of prejudice is omnipresent in a jury trial, but prejudice may sneak
in the back door at a suppression hearing. When the feared prejudice is
overt, courts may be more trustworthy than juries. We may shield the jury
from knowledge of the defendant's prior record,248 yet not hesitate to give
the suppression court that information. The record has probative value,
which the judge can separate from its prejudicial tendency. With other
factors, prejudice may be hidden in the police officer's "expertise." For
example, when a police officer describes a neighborhood as "high crime"
or "drug-prone," a court cannot exercise the judicial detachment relied
upon with factors involving overt prejudice. The court may completely
accept the expertise, risking that the officer's prejudice about ghetto neigh-
borhoods clouds his evaluation of the probability of crime contributed by
the neighborhood. The court may also reject the testimony.
These two alternatives are both too extreme. Caution is most appropri-
ate. Courts should be reluctant to place substantial weight on facts where
expertise and prejudice often intersect. This is the approach that the Cali-
fornia courts have taken to testimony about a "high-crime" area. Because
247. See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam) (striking down
property ownership restriction on right to vote because fundamental interest is infringed); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (invalidating California law barring persons from bringing
indigents into state because such law impermissibly burdens interstate commerce).
248. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith."); see also id.
609(a) (limiting impeachment by evidence of conviction to cases in which probative value of evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect).
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the factor is "easily subject to abuse" and because it is a factor outside the
individual's control, the factor is appraised with great circumspection."4'
Not all factors based on expertise warrant such caution. The risks of
error or unfairness are small when courts credit police expertise concern-
ing the usual behavioral patterns of numbers runners or the packaging
used by diamond smugglers. It is the intersection of expertise with com-
mon prejudices that produces a greater likelihood of error. This intersec-
tion also creates injustice, or at least the appearance of injustice. The sus-
pect's social or economic class, whether or not it constitutionally compels
heightened scrutiny, is the factor most like "high-crime" neighborhoods in
the feeling of unfairness its use produces. Furthermore, both the factors of
class and neighborhood may easily be used as facades for race; this possi-
bility should induce additional reluctance about attaching substantial
weight to their presence.250
CONCLUSION
I end this Article with the man who began my interest in the subject.
My client, Jos6 Tirado,251 was stopped for pushing a two-wheeled shop-
ping cart with a TV and speakers in it. Not a month before I was as-
signed the case, I pushed just such a shopping cart loaded with similar
items past several police officers. A friend of mine had also moved a TV
in that manner in the same month. Mr. Tirado is Hispanic and was
poorly dressed; I am blond and was dressed for court. Mr. Tirado was
walking in a poor New York City neighborhood; I was walking in Brook-
lyn Heights. Mr. Tirado increased his pace when followed by four plain-
clothes officers of another race; I certainly would have done the same.
249. See People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115, 119, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 860
(1979); In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 897, 582 P.2d 957, 962, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 371 (1978).
250. Another likely surrogate for race is language. Courts should therefore be cautious in afford-
ing great weight to the speaking of Spanish (or Chinese). For a consideration of the problem of
variables that function as surrogates for race in the prediction of parole success, see Coffee, The
Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentenc-
ing Commission, 66 GEo. L.J. 975, 1002 n.71 (1978).
While less troubling, youth, a "hippie" appearance, Rastafarian affiliation, and other unpopular or
unsavory voluntary associations are also likely to generate some "expert" prejudice and consequently
exaggeration of their probative value. Perhaps these factors too should be more carefully examined.
These policy considerations, as invoked by the California courts in the "high-crime" neighborhood
cases, would not flatly prohibit consideration of the disfavored factors, but would invite a skeptical
outlook toward the weight they should be accorded.
Other policy considerations than those I have suggested are possible. Professor Underwood has
proposed a two-tier hierarchy of predictors. In her view, factors beyond the individual's control are
the least desirable predictors because they present the greatest threat to individual autonomy. Under-
wood, supra note 210, at 1436. In addition, predictors that induce, reward, or punish behavior which
"falls in a zone in which there is a strong social commitment to protecting an individual's private and
personal choices" should also be avoided when reasonably reliable substitutes are available. Id. at
1437-38.
251. See People v. Tirado, 79 A.D.2d 907, 434 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1981).
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When Mr. Tirado attempted to engage a large black woman in conversa-
tion (the officer stressed her race and size), he was stopped; neither I nor
my friend was detained or even followed. The suppression court sustained
the police action. At oral argument of the appeal, one judge commented
that he personally had moved furniture with such a shopping cart. Never-
theless, the court unanimously upheld the seizure.
One could always respond that the police should have stopped and
questioned all four of us. I will not dispute that here; how much suspicion
is "enough" is a question for another day. One could instead argue that
regardless of what courts do, police will still respond to race, poverty, and
bad neighborhoods-and that the only consequence of adopting my analy-
sis is increased suppression of reliable evidence and release of the guilty.
To my mind, this position turns its back on all the harassed minority
group members the courts never see, those innocent citizens who are de-
tained by reason of their race, but exonerated before formal charges are
filed.
Certainly, judicial refusal to consider race as an acceptable component
of probable cause will not eliminate police beliefs that poor Hispanics in
bad neighborhoods are likely to be committing crimes. Whether judicial
pronouncements that race is irrelevant to suspicion will deter police of-
ficers from detaining persons on the basis of their race is more difficult.
This is a tiny part of the larger argument about the exclusionary rule:
Does the sanction of exclusion effectively inhibit police illegality or does it
merely set free some factually guilty defendants?52
I am of the more optimistic view that the police can be encouraged to
respect constitutional rights, but I do not think that the argument that
courts should disregard race rests upon an empirical assumption that po-
lice will follow suit. At the very least, declaring that it is illegitimate to
consider these factors in decisions to detain will affect civil suits, both
those seeking injunctive relief and those seeking damages for an unlawful
arrest.
That constitutional dictates have not been and might not be enforced is
not sufficient reason for courts to stop espousing them. It is important for
the courts to say that suspicion based on factors beyond a person's control
is wrong, and that action clearly based upon such suspicion will not be
tolerated. Such a statement may be small consolation to the minority
252. There is substantial literature on the value of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent. See, e.g.,
Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE
398 (1979); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It Is a Deterrent to
Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979). For a survey of earlier literature on the question, see Comment,
Trends in Legal Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 373
(1974).
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group member stopped on the basis of his race, but it is better than noth-
ing.253 To bow to executive refusal to enforce the law
. . . would be enshrining the rather perverse notion that traditional
rights are not to be protected in precisely those instances when pro-
tection is essential, i.e., when a dominant group has succeeded in
temporarily frustrating exercise of those rights. We prefer a view
more compatible with the theory of this nation's founding: rights do
not cease to exist because a government fails to secure them. See The
Declaration of Independence (1776).254
253. Public perception of the courts as protectors of minorities may be deteriorating. In 1968, 72%
of blacks compared to 30% of whites viewed the Supreme Court favorably, but a 1974 study found
that black approval had fallen to match the lower approval rate of whites. See Siegelman, Black-White
Differences in Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court: A Replication in the 1970's, 60 Soc. Sc. Q.
113 (1979).
254. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 730 (10th Cir. 1980) (rejecting
state's argument that Mescaleros could not have exclusive land rights since "tide of white settlers
obliterated any traditional territory").
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